The macroeconomic andemploymentoutlookunderheightened uncertainty1Global macroeconomic conditionsEconomic uncertaintyhas beenhighin 2025, shaped byongoing conflicts, geoeconomic realignments,andtrade-related disruptions.While output continues to expand at amodestpaceand inflationary pressures continue to ease,the combined weight of this uncertain landscape andsystemic transitions–such as those related to climate,technology, and demographics–casts a long shadow overboth growth trajectories and labour market dynamics.Against this backdrop, the global economy is expected togrowby2.8per cent in 2025, accordingtotheInternational MonetaryFund’s(IMF)April 2025WorldEconomic Outlook(WEO)projections. This figurerepresents a downwardrevisionof0.4percentage pointscompared totheIMFWEOOctober 2024projections,highlighting thevolatilitythat has characterisedthe pastsix months.2,3Inflation, whileexpectedto fall across mostregions,remains above target in many countries, with aprojected global average of4.4per centin 2025 comparedto5.8 per cent in 2024.Althoughthe decline in inflationhas created room for more accommodative monetarypolicy in some economies,disinflationgainshave beenoffset by rising trade barriers, volatile capital flows,supplychain disruptions, andpersistentlyhigh public debt levels.High-frequency labour market indicators, availableformostlyhigh-income countries,tellasimilarlymixed story.While unemploymentratesincountries withearly2025dataremainat historiclows,job vacanciesareslightly belowtheir long-termtrends, and businessand consumer sentimenthasdeclined in the firstquarter of 2025(see Figures 1 and 2).The lowunemployment rates, coupled withleadingindicatorssuchasjob vacanciesand business confidencebothbelow1ThissectionincorporatestheIMF’s WEOprojections based on informationavailable as of April 4, 2025. Additionally, the high-frequency datareferenced extends through the first quarter of 2025 and reflectsupdates available as of April 30.2TheIMF’s WEOprojections from October 2024are usedas a referencepoint, astheseprovide full country-level yearly estimates. In contrast,the January 2025 WEO updateonlyincludes global and regional figures. trend, maysuggestthatemployersare morecautiousabout hiring new workers during this period ofuncertainty, though theyareretainingtheir existingemployees.This potential slowdown in hiring could beAlthough GDP is unable to capture the manyaspects of workers’ well-being, itandother high-frequency indicatorsoffer early signalsofchangeemerging at the start of 2025, whilemore directincomemeasures more closely relate to household well-beingoften lag monthsor even years behind. 3 uncertaintyandchallenges associated with reducingdependence on external energy sources and advancingthe green energy transition. The resurgence of tradeprotectionism and global fragmentationhaveledgovernments across the regiontorethinkindustrial policyand supply chain dependencies(Hodge et al., 2024).Africa’s economic growth is projected to riseto3.8percent in 2025 from 3.0per cent in 2024.Despite thisimprovement, progress remains fragile. Highinflationrates,debt vulnerabilities,and regional instabilitycontinue to constrain recovery.In addition, the currenttrade climate has generated new challenges for thisregion, which generally faces lower tariffs in developedcountry markets due to preferential trade agreements(UNCTAD, 2025).In the Arab States, growth remainsdividedbetween oil-exporting and import-dependent economies, with thewhole regionnowprojectedto growat2.3per cent in2025(againstaprevious forecastof 4.1 per cent).Whileeasing global energy prices are improving inflationdynamics, conflict spillovers continue to dampenconfidence.Theemployment outlookThe weakening of the global economyin2025hasimportant implications for employment prospectsworldwide, withlowereconomic growthlikely totranslateintosloweremploymentgrowthin the shortterm.A keydriver ofthe more pessimistic outlook isthe recent shift intradedynamics,which has heightened uncertainty aroundglobal demand.This is especially relevant forworkerstiedto US consumption and investmentdemand,who nowface elevated risks of partial or total income lossdue tohigher tariffs andthe unpredictability of future trademeasures.As of 2023, an estimated 84 millionworkershavejobslinked directly or indirectly through supply chains tofinal demand from the United States in the 71countries with available data(seeTable1).5Thatamounts to 4.3 per cent of total employment in thesecountries. Most of thoseworkers–56 million–are in Asiaand the Pacific, though the share of total employment ishighest in Canada and Mexico, at 17.1 per cent.While5More details on the calculation of the number of workers with jobsthatlinked to final demand in the United States can be found in theTechnical Annex. offset by the still prevalent labour shortages in many high-income countries; however, in some developing countriesit could lead to higher unemployment and increasedinformality.Trade policy