日本的生育能力：请多生孩子（英）2024

Japan’sFertility:MoreChildrenPlease Japan KoheiAsao,DanilaSmirnov,andTengTengXu SIP/2024/025 IMFSelectedIssuesPapersarepreparedbyIMFstaffasbackgrounddocumentationforperiodicconsultationswithmembercountries.ItisbasedontheinformationavailableatthetimeitwascompletedonApril15,2024.ThispaperisalsopublishedseparatelyasIMFCountryReportNo.24/119. 2024 JUN ©2024InternationalMonetaryFundSIP/2024/025 IMFSelectedIssuesPaper AsiaandPacificDepartment Japan’sFertility:MoreChildrenPlease PreparedbyKoheiAsao,DanilaSmirnov,andTengTengXu AuthorizedfordistributionbyRanilSalgado June2024 IMFSelectedIssuesPapersarepreparedbyIMFstaffasbackgrounddocumentationforperiodicconsultationswithmembercountries.ItisbasedontheinformationavailableatthetimeitwascompletedonApril15,2024.ThispaperisalsopublishedseparatelyasIMFCountryReportNo.24/119. ABSTRACT:Japan’sfertilityhasdeclinedinthepastthreedecades.RaisingJapan’sfertilityrateisakeypolicypriorityforthegovernment.Usingcross-countryanalysisandcasestudies,thispaperfindsthatthemostsuccessfulmeasuretosupportthefertilityrateistheprovisionofchildcarefacilities,particularlyforchildrenaged0-2.Offeringstrongerincentivesfortheuseofpaternityleavecanalleviatetheburdenofchildcareonmothers,supportingfertility.Ontheotherhand,thereislimitedevidencethatcashtransfersareeffectiveinsupportingfertility,basedoninternationalexperience. RECOMMENDEDCITATION:K.Asao,D.Smirnov,andT.Xu.2024.“Japan’sFertility:MoreChildrenPlease”IMFSelectedIssuesPaper(SIP/2024/025).Washington,D.C.:InternationalMonetaryFund. JELClassificationNumbers: J01;J08;J13;J16 Keywords: Fertility,childcare,gender,labormarket Author’sE-MailAddress: kasao@imf.org;dsmirnov@imf.org;txu@imf.org SELECTEDISSUESPAPERS Japan’sFertility:MoreChildrenPlease Japan PreparedbyKoheiAsao,DanilaSmirnov,andTengTengXu1 1“Theauthor(s)wouldliketothankYanCarrière-SwallowandseminarparticipantsattheMinistryofFinanceofJapanforusefulcommentsanddiscussions. April15,2024 JAPAN SELECTEDISSUES PreparedByKoheiAsao,DanilaSmirnov,andTengTengXu(allAPD). ApprovedBy AsiaandPacificDepartment CONTENTS JAPAN’SFERTILITY:MORECHILDRENPLEASE2 A.Introduction2 B.StylizedFacts3 C.DataandMethodology7 D.EmpiricalResults8 E.PolicyImplications11 BOX 1.SwedenandGermany:CaseStudiesofChildren-RelatedPolicies6 TABLES 1.LinearRegressionsBetweenFertilityandPolicyMeasures7 2.BaselineCross-CountryRegressions:FertilityGrowthandEconomicGrowth9 3.MainCross-CountryRegressions:FertilityGrowthandPolicies10References13 JAPAN’SFERTILITY:MORECHILDRENPLEASE1 Japan’sfertilityhasdeclinedinthepastthreedecades.RaisingJapan’sfertilityrateisakeypolicypriorityforthegovernment.Usingcross-countryanalysisandcasestudies,thispaperfindsthatthemostsuccessfulmeasuretosupportthefertilityrateistheprovisionofchildcarefacilities,particularlyforchildrenaged0-2.Offeringstrongerincentivesfortheuseofpaternityleavecanalleviatetheburdenofchildcareonmothers,supportingfertility.Ontheotherhand,thereislimitedevidencethatcashtransfersareeffectiveinsupportingfertility,basedoninternationalexperience. A.Introduction 1.Japan’sfertilityhasbeenonadecliningpathsincethe1990s,buthasstabilizedatalowlevelinthepastdecade.Thenumberofbirths reachedarecordlow,whilethefertilityratedeclinedtoabout1.26in2022.Japan’sfertilityrateisoneofthelowestamongG7economies,butitremainshigherthanotherEastAsianadvancedeconomiessuchasKorea,HongKong,andSingapore.SeveralreasonscontributedtoJapan’sdecliningfertilityrate,includinglaterandfewermarriages,ahighgendergapinunpaidhousework,andtheprevalenceofwomenengaginginnon-regularemployment(contributingtoagenderwagegap). Theincreasedavailabilityofchildcarefacilitiesinthepastdecade,however,helpedstabilizethefertilityrate.Givenadeclininglaborforceduetoanagingpopulation,supportingfertilitycanhelpboostJapan’sgrowthpotential.Atthesametime,ahigherfertilityratecouldhelpalleviatethepressurefromgrowingpublicspendingonhealthcareandpensions. 2.TheauthoritieshaveannouncedinitiativestoraiseJapan’sfertilityrate,akeypolicypriorityundertheKishidaadministration.Theyformulatedthe“Children'sFutureStrategy”in2023,aimedtoincreasechildren-relatedspendingby3.6trillionyen(approximately0.6percentofGDP)peryearbyFY2028.Additionally,thegovernmentannouncedplanstodoublethebudgetallocationfortheChildren'sAgencybyearly2030s.Thestrategyalsoincludesplanstopromoteco-parentingandtostrengthensupportforchild-rearinghouseholdsincludingexpansionofchildcarefacilities. 3.Empiricalandtheoreticalliteraturesuggeststhatthepoliciesthatreduceeducationcostsandopportunitycostsformotherstoraisechildrenhavethemostpositiveeffectonfertility.Specifically,UnitedNations(2019,2021)assesstheeffectivenessofpoliciestoaddresslowfertilitygloballyandfindthatprovidingwidelyavailable,accessible,andhigh-qualitychildcareis 1PreparedbyKoheiAsao,DanilaSmirnov,andTengTengXu(allAPD).WethankYanCarrière-SwallowandseminarparticipantsattheMinistryofFinanceofJapanforusefulcommentsanddiscussions. 2INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND indispensabletosustaininghigherfertilityrates.InthecontextoftheUnitedStates,Coskunan