2025年四季度美国公共PE和GP交易综述（英）

Contents Institutional Research Group Garrett HindsSenior Research Analyst,Private Equitygarrett.hinds@pitchbook.com How the Big Seven are framing the software reset PE performance5 Jinny Choi Senior Research Analyst,Private Equityjinny.choi@pitchbook.com Deployment7 Realizations9 Kyle WaltersResearch Analyst, Private Equitykyle.walters@pitchbook.com Fundraising 11 Strategy expansion pbinstitutionalresearch@pitchbook.com Published on February 27, 2026 Share of AUM by manager and strategy 19 GP deal activity21 GP stake transactions23 Operating results25 Stock performance and comparables26 Note: “PE” has a specific meaning for the seven major public alternative managers referencedin this report. 1.BlackstoneandCarlyle: “Corporate PE” as defined in company reports.2.KKR: “Traditional PE” as defined in company reports.3.Apollo: “Flagship PE” and “European principal finance” as defined in company reports.4.Ares: “Corporate PE” and “special opportunities” as defined in company reports.5.TPG: “Capital” and “growth” as defined in company reports.16.Blue Owl: “PE” represents PitchBook estimates of ownership stakes held by “GP StrategicCapital” funds in managers primarily engaged in PE buyout and growth equity strategies. Note: “Private credit” has a specific meaning for the seven major public alternative managersreferenced in this report. 1.KKR: “Alternative Credit” as defined in company reports.2.Ares: “US Senior Direct Lending” as defined in company reports.3.Blue Owl: “Direct Lending Gross Returns” as defined in company reports.4.Apollo: “Direct Origination” as defined in company reports.5.Blackstone: “Private Credit” as defined in company reports.6.Carlyle: “Global Credit” as defined in company reports.7.TPG: “TPG AG Credit” as defined in company reports. Key takeaways Deployment:After a measured start to the year, PE deploymentaccelerated meaningfully in Q4, supported by improvingfinancing conditions and greater confidence in the macrobackdrop as well as pro-growth policy signals in the US. Privatecredit deployment remained robust throughout the year,reinforcing its role as a default financing channel within theprivate equity ecosystem. Performance:Private equity returns were stable in 2025, withthe Big Seven posting a median 9% TTM return and strongerquarterly momentum into year-end. While PE strategiescontinue to trail public markets on a TTM basis, private credithas stood out for its superior risk-adjusted performance, withthe largest managers delivering returns that compare favorablywith the broader universe of private credit GPs. Realizations and exits:Exit activity improved meaningfullyin 2025, with trailing 12-month (TTM) realizations rising formost managers as IPO markets reopened and M&A sentimentstrengthened. While quarterly results were uneven, firmsexpressed growing confidence in 2026 exit pipelines, even asAI-related volatility is set to introduce more selectivity aroundtiming and asset monetization. GP stakes and consolidation:GP deal activity remainedelevated, with strategic acquisitions and minority-staketransactions signaling continued consolidation and investordemand for diversified revenue streams. Activity in GP stakes,secondaries, and sports-related investments highlights theexpanding tool kit managers are using to drive growth beyondtraditional buyouts. How the Big Seven are framing thesoftware reset The central debate in markets today is whether AI willcommoditize software. That question has pushed many publicsoftware valuations to multiyear lows and raised concernsabout private credit exposure to software-backed deals as wellas equity risk within PE portfolios. The result has been broadrisk aversion and tighter liquidity, with investors repricing firstand reassessing fundamentals later. This dynamic is visible inthe share price performance of the Big Seven PE firms, most ofwhich are down more than 20% YTD as we go to press. On the credit side, firms pointed to structural insulation. First-lien positioning, conservative attachment points, meaningfulequity cushions, and limited reliance on lending against annualrecurring revenue were cited as safeguards. Several executivesdescribed the market reaction as emotional or extreme,drawing a clear distinction between mark-to-market volatilityand realized losses. At the same time, managers acknowledged that AI is agenuine disruptor and that software is beginning to bifurcate.Systems of record, infrastructure software, cybersecurity,and companies with proprietary data were viewed as relativewinners. Thin-moat application software underwritten at peakvaluations faces greater pressure. Vintage risk, more than AIalone, was frequently identified as the core source of stress. Still, it is worth separating narrative from behavior. Computercode has been inexpensive and widely available for decades,yet enterprises continue to pay for integrated, trusted systems.Free open-source alternatives to Microsoft Office have longexi