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制度与欧盟加入:各国如何在加入前就实现繁荣

机械设备 2026-04-30 世界银行 李艺华🌸
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How Countries ProsperEven Before Entry Europe and Central Asia in FocusOffice of the Chief Economist Ivailo IzvorskiJoana Madjoska Institutions and How Countries ProsperEven Before Entry Ivailo IzvorskiJoana Madjoska © 2025 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank1818 H Street NWWashington DC 20433Telephone: 202-473-1000Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings,interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The WorldBank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the data included in thiswork and does not assume responsibility for any errors, omissions, or discrepancies in the information,or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information, methods, processes, or conclusionsset forth. The boundaries, colors, denominations, links/footnotes and other information shown in this Nothing herein shall constitute or be construed or considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of theprivileges and immunities of The World Bank, all of which are specifically reserved. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination ofits knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long asfull attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World BankPublications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625;e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. Cover illustration: generated by ChatGPT, December 1, 2025, from prompt “Perspective view fromcandidate countries toward EU horizon, a long elegant bridge stretching forward.” Subsequentmodifications made using traditional design tools. Contents Abbreviationsiv1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12. Literature review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23. Data sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24. Methodology and results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Figures 1.EU 2004 accession round: average governance scores before and afterEU accession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.EU 2004 accession round: average governance score as a share of EU15. . . . . . . . .3.The 2004 enlargement round: distribution of governance indicators. . . . . . . . . . . .4.Bulgaria (2007 round) distribution of governance indicators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5.Romania (2007 round): distribution of governance indicators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.Croatia (2013): distribution of governance indicators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7.Synthetic controls and new member states by accession wave (rule of law). . . . . . .8.Average Treatment Effect (ATT) per EU accession wave. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9.Estonia: estimated effect of EU accession on the rule of law WGI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10.Estonia: observed outcome and synthetic control for the rule of law WGI. . . . . . . .11.Romania: estimated effect of EU accession on the rule of law WGI. . . . . . . . . . . . . .12.Romania: observed outcome and synthetic control outcome for the rule of Tables 1.Estimation output (SDID). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.Estimation output, Callaway and Sant’Anna). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.Logistic regression, rule of law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abbreviations ATTAverage Treatment EffectCIConfidence IntervalECAEurope and Central AsiaEUEuropean UnionEU15The 15 EU member states before the 2004 enlargementNMSNew Member StatesOECDOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentSDIDSynthetic Control Difference in DifferenceSEStandard ErrorWGIWorldwide Governance Indicators 1. Introduction The prospect of European Union (EU) membership has long beenthe most potent external anchor for governance reforms for EUcandidate countries. Existing empirical work has shown that thelink between EU accession and compliance with the EU body of law(acquis) has been the principal lever that has reshaped candidatecountries’ institutions and legal frameworks. Meeting the acces-sion criteria obliges accession countries to strengthen their institu- In this context, this note aims to contribute to the discussion bylooking at the institutional gains both before and after EU acces-sion across the last three EU enlargement rounds (2004, 20