三个全球集体行动问题的教训（英）2026

26-6.Lessons from Three Global Collective Action Problems Kimberly A. ClausingApril 2026 ABSTRACT This paper compares three global collective action problems, those involvingclimate change, international trade, and international taxation. First, each problemis assessed in terms of fundamental elements that stymie global collective action:concentrated interests that deter action in the face of larger yet diffuse benefits,cross-jurisdictional policy spillovers, and free-rider incentives at the jurisdictionallevel. Second, each problem is assessed in terms of four key elements that help Kimberly Clausingis theEric M. Zolt Professor ofTax Law and Policy atUniversity of California, Los JEL codes:F53, H73, H87.Keywords:climate policy; international tax; international trade; global Author’s Note:This working paper is forthcoming inVirginia Tax Review. I am gratefulto Shane Ball for excellent research assistance and Greg Auclair for fact-checking. Ireceived helpful feedback from Maurice Obstfeld as well as participants at the BerlinMax Planck conference, the Pace Law and American Tax Policy Institute Conference, I. GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS Collective action problems are plentiful, but some are more vexing than others. A collectiveaction problem ariseswhen cooperation would make the group better off butsomeinterests stand in the way of progress. Multiple factors impedebeneficial collective action:coordination failures, transaction costs, and the combination of concentrated harms fromaction alongsidediffuse benefits. Examples are manifold; consumers benefit from policies Thescope of the collective action problem is important; in general, the larger thescope of the collective action problem, the more difficult it is to solve. Increasedcoordination costs are one factor, but the bigger difficulty is spillover effects amongjurisdictions. A single community can developmechanisms to offsetthe harms from policyaction, generating the possibility of Pareto-improving policies, or they can coordinate to For example, a local community may be able to overcome the collective actionproblem surrounding the provision of a lighthouse through compulsory taxation, protectingnearbyboats from rocky shoals. But if one seaside community attempts to regulate fishingcatches in order to assure the health of the fishing stock, their collective action may easilybe stymied by the free-riding of other jurisdictions, who have every incentiveto avoid This paper seeks to compare three global collective action problems: responding toclimate change;providing an open, rules-based international trading system;andaddressinginternational tax competition. In each case, thecoming subsections discuss Section II turns to the mechanics of addressing global collective action, consideringfour factors that are essential to successful resolution: a shared understanding of theproblem, the formation of a coalition willing to take policy action, incentive mechanismsthat facilitate policy adoption and protect adopters from nonadopters, and leadership. This Finally, section IIIdiscusses two key lessons from these three global collectiveaction problems. First, while the other elements of policy solutions are importantprerequisites, well-designed incentive mechanisms are pivotal; they respond to the root of mechanisms in place to encourage policy adoption and to protect adopters from the Second, given the context of today’s particularly challenging geopoliticaldevelopments, the world needs collective action around the importance of globalcollective action, to counter the forces of disintegration and isolationism put forward by Climate as a Global Collective Action Problem Of the three problems, climate change presents the clearest example of a truly globalcollective action problem. The consequences of climate inaction are far from even acrossthe globe, but they affect nearly every jurisdiction—and the people within—in an adversefashion. While temperature is often held up as a key component of climate change, andcentral to calculations of the social cost of greenhouse gas emissions, extreme weather events and wildfires generate enormous damage, even in regions where temperaturechanges may be relatively benign. As one example, recent research on the United States Many international reports, including those from the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC), have warned of dire consequences for the world’s population ifgreenhouse gas emissions are not addressed. Yet collective action is often difficult tomuster, and several factors inhibit it. Those experiencing costs from climate policy arelikely to object, and these costs are often concentrated, as climate action harms fossil fuelproducers (whether private or state-runfirms) andemissions-intensive industries (such as However, the biggest hurdle to action is likely the problems associated with cross-jurisdictional spillovers. Emissions of greenhouse gases anywhere on the planet affect the