WORKINGPAPER|ISSUE04/2023|25APRIL2023 GLOBALTRENDSIN COUNTRIES‘PERCEPTIONSOFTHEBELTANDROAD INITIATIVE ALICIAGARCÍA-HERREROANDROBINSCHINDOWSKI Drawingonglobalmediareports,weconductasentimentanalysisoftheimageofChina’sBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI)andtheevolutionofitsimageovertime.Ourmainfindingisthatperceptionsoftheinitiativedeterioratedsignificantlyinmanygeographiesfrom2017to2022.Thenotableexceptionisinsub-SaharanAfricawheretheBRI’simageremainspositive,evenifslightlylesssothaninthepast.ThisisnotwithstandingincreasesindebtlevelswithChina,muchofwhichnowfacepotentialrestructuring.Furthermore,wefindsignificantinter-andintra-regionaldifferences intheaveragesentimenttowardsChina’slandmarkproject,aswellasamuchworseimageoftheinitiativeincountrieswhich,untiltoday,arenotpartoftheBRI.Finally,wefocusontheEuropeanUnion,AfricaandChina’simmediateneighbourhoodtobetterunderstandthecomplexitiesbehindtheperceivedbenefitsandchallengesassociatedwithChina’sBeltandRoadInitiative. TheauthorsthankGrégoryClaeys,MikkoHuotari,MatthiasStepan,MarieLeMouel,JerominZettelmeyer,SéverineArsène,AlessiaAmighiniandtheparticipantsinaBruegeleventonthistopicfortheirvaluablecomments. AliciaGarcía-Herrero(alicia.garcia-herrero@bruegel.org)isaSeniorFellowatBruegelRobinSchindowski(robin.schindowski@bruegel.org)isaResearchAssistantatBruegel ThisprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sHorizonEuroperesearchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementnumber101061700. Viewsexpressedarethoseoftheauthor(s)onlyanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheEuropeanUnion.NeithertheEuropeanUnionnorthegrantingauthoritycanbeheldresponsibleforthem. Recommendedcitation: García-Herrero,A.,andR.Schindowski(2023)‘Globaltrendsincountries‘perceptionsoftheBeltandRoadInitiative’,WorkingPaper04/2023,Bruegel 1Introduction AlmostadecadehaspassedsincePresidentXiJinpingannouncedthelaunchoftheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI),originallytitled‘OneBeltOneRoad’.TheBRIhassinceexpandedintooneofChina’smostimportanttoolsforthebuild-upofsoftpowerandtheimplementationofitsoverseasactivities(Dadabaev,2018).Simultaneously,however,theinitiativehasattractedcontroversyintheinternationalmedia,particularlyafterCOVID-19ledtowidespreaddisruptionofglobaleconomicactivity1.Thedownturncauseddebtdistressinmanydevelopingcountries,manyofwhichreceivedmassiveChineseinvestmentpriorto2020.ThisraisesthequestionastohowthesentimenttowardstheBRIhasevolvedacrosstheglobe. Onthepositiveside,theBRIhassupplementedexistingofficialdevelopmentassistancefrominstitutionssuchastheWorldBankandtheAsianDevelopmentBank.Withmassivefinancing,Chinahasprovidedlarge-scaleinfrastructureinvestmenttoBeltandRoadcountries.PriortotheCOVID-19pandemic,recipientcountries,especiallythoselackingthefinancialmeanstosatisfytheirneedforinvestment,weregenerallyoptimisticabouttheinitiative.By2022,theBRIhadofficiallyexpandedto149memberstates.In2018alone,thenumberofcountrieswithMemorandumsofUnderstandingwithChinaalmostdoubled.TheliteraturehasconfirmedthepotentialbenefitsChinacouldbringtoBeltandRoadcountries,especiallythroughtradeandinvestmentchannels.García-HerreroandXu(2017)estimatedEurope’sexpectedtradegainsas6percentabovethenon-BRIbenchmarkcase,and3percentabovetradegainsinAsia.Therestoftheworldwouldsufferareductionintradeof0.004percent.Casestudiesforspecificcountrieshaveequallyportrayedapotentialforpositiveimpact.AstudybytheWorldBank(BogdanandNajdov,2020)foundthattradeandinvestmentflowsundertheBRIcouldincreaseAzerbaijan’sGDPby21percentinthelongrun,dependingontheimplementationofcomplementarypoliciessuchastheharmonisationoftransportationtariffsandlegalconditionsacrosstheregion.Additionally,Li(2018)foundthatthetwointernationaltransportcorridors (Primorye-1andPrimorye-2)undertheBRIlinkingEastSiberiawiththeAsia-PacificregionprovidenewopportunitiesforRussiaaswell. CriticshavepointedoutthatprojectsinitiatedundertheBRIumbrellalacktheappropriateregulatoryframeworkandmarketcoordination.Withoutrelyingonmarketmechanisms,countriesruntheriskofengagingintoomanyprojectssimultaneously,whichislikelytobeunprofitableinthelongrun.GiventhatmostofChina’sfinancialsupportistoberepaid,debtsustainabilityinthehostcountrieshas 1JamesKyngeandJonathanWheatley,‘Chinapullsbackfromtheworld:rethinkingXi’s“projectofthecentury”’,FinancialTimes,11December2022,https://www.ft.com/content/d9bd8059-d05c-4e6f-968b-1672241ec1f6. becomeaconcern.Forinstance,Sheng(2018)studiedChina’sinvestmenttransactionsinUzbekistanandBangladeshandfoundthatBRI-relatedinvestmentstandsatavalueofover20percentoftheirgrossdomesticproduct(GDP).WatchersalsodoubtwhetherChinahasfulleconomicstrengthtosustain‘non-profitable’overseasprojectswithoutcoordinatingwithenoughcommercialinterests. Beyondlegalandeconomicaspects,internationalbacklashcancomefromdiplomaticconsiderations.Forinstance,IndiaisawareofbeingisolatediftheBRIgainsstrongsupport(Banerjee,2016). Eventually,circumstanceshaveradicallychangedwiththeonsetoftheCOVID-19pandemic.Lockdownsallaroundtheworldinflictedaheavytollontheglobaleconomyandstimulusforaneconomicrevivalhasconsu