No2023-04–February WorkingPaper TaxAvoidanceandtheComplexity ofMultinationalEnterprises ManonFrancois&VincentVicard Highlights Weinvestigatewhetherthecomplexityoftheownershipstructureofmultinationalenterprisesfacilitates profitshifting. Weusefirm-levelcross-countrydata. AffiliatesbelongingtomorecomplexMNEsaremorelikelytobuncharoundzeroprofit,whichisconsistentwithcomplexityenablingtaxavoidancebymultinationals. OnlythemorecomplexMNEsshiftprofitsawayfromtheirhigh-taxaffiliates,whileMNEswithflatownershipstructuresdonotdisplaysuchpattern. CEPIIWorkingPaperTaxAvoidanceandtheComplexityofMultinationalEnterprises Abstract Doesthecomplexityoftheownershipstructureofmultinationalenterprises'(MNEs)servetaxavoidance?Weusefirm-levelcross-countrydatatoshowthataffiliatesbelongingtomorecomplexMNEsaremorelikelytobuncharoundzeroprofit,whichisconsistentwithcomplexityenablingtaxavoidancebymultinationals.OurresultsshowthatonlythemorecomplexMNEsshiftprofitsawayfromtheirhigh-taxaffiliates,whileMNEswithflatownershipstructuresdonotdisplaysuchpattern. Keywords Complexity,Firmorganization,Multinationalenterprises,Profitshifting,Taxavoidance. JEL F23,H2,L22. WorkingPaper CEPII(Centred’EtudesProspectivesetd’InformationsInternationales)isaFrenchinstitutededicatedtoproducingindependent,policy-orientedeconomicresearchhelpfultounderstandtheinternationaleconomicenvironmentandchallengesintheareasoftradepolicy,competitiveness,macroeconomics,internationalfinanceandgrowth. CEPIIWorkingPaper Contributingtoresearchininternational economics ©CEPII,PARIS,2023 Allrightsreserved.Opinionsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthor(s)alone. EditorialDirector:AntoineBouët Production:LaureBoivinPublishedon16.02.23NoISSN:1293-2574 CEPII 20,avenuedeSégurTSA10726 75334ParisCedex07 contact@cepii.fr Presscontact:presse@cepii.frwww.cepii.fr–@CEPII_Paris Taxavoidanceandthecomplexityofmultinationalenterprises1 ManonFrancois∗andVincentVicard† 1.Introduction Multinationalenterprises(MNEs)organizetheirproductionthroughanetworkoftensorevenhundredsofaffiliateslocatedindifferentcountries.WhileMNEsandtheirforeignaffiliatesareabuildingblockofglobalvaluechainsandaccountforalargeshareofinternationaltradeandproduction,2littleisknownabouthowMNEsorganizetheownershipoftheirnetworkofaffiliatesanditsconsequences. MNEsmayimplementaflatownershipstructureinwhichtheheadquarterholdsaffiliatesdirectly,ormorecomplexstructuresinvolvingchainsofownershipinwhichsubsidiariesareownedbyintermediariesthatmaybelocatedindifferentcountries.3Thechoiceofownershipstructureisshapedbytheorganizationofpro-duction,i.e.theindustrydiversificationoftheMNE,itsgeographicfootprintorthedegreeoffragmentationofitsproductionprocessanditsoutsourcingdecisions.Italsoreflectsotherdeterminantsincludinginternalfinancing,expropriationrisks,pastM&Ahistoryortaxmotives(UNCTAD,2016).4Notably,descriptiveevidenceshowsthatconduitentitiesinoffshorefinancialcentersortaxhavensarecentraltocomplexownershipstructures.5 Inthispaper,wepositthatacomplexownershipstructuremayservetaxavoidanceandinvestigatewhetherbeingpartofmoreorlesscomplexMNEsaffectsprofitshiftingbetweensubsidiaries.MNEsminimizetheiroveralltaxliabilitiesbyshiftingprofitsfromhightolow-taxsubsidiariesusingthreemaininstruments:themanipulationoftheirtransferpricesintradeingoods,debtshiftingandthelocationofintangiblesin 1TheauthorsthankparticipantstotheRIDGEPublicEconomics,AFSEandADRESconferences,PhDGlobalTaxSympo-siumandPSE,Paris1,Paris2,EvryUniversity,NiceUniversity,ResearchColloquiumonGlobalTaxGovernanceandCEPIIseminarsforhelpfuldiscussions.TheauthorsalsothankKatazynaBilickaandDhammikaDharmapalaforhelpfulcomments.Thisworkisco-fundedbyaFrenchgovernmentsubsidymanagedbytheAgenceNationaledelaRechercheundertheframe-workoftheInvestissementsd’avenirprogrammeANR-17-EURE-0001.ManonFrancoisacknowledgessupportoftheGANo.TAXUD/2022/DE/310grantandoftheResearchCouncilofNorwayGrantsNo.325720and341289. ∗EUTaxObservatory-ParisSchoolofEconomics-Paris1University(manon.francois@psemail.eu) †CEPII(vincent.vicard@cepii.fr) 2UNCTAD(2016)underlinethatlessthan1%ofMNEshavemorethan100affiliates,buttheseMNEsaccountforalmost 60%ofglobalMNEvalueadded. 3AlabreseandCasella(2020)findthatthecountryoflocationofthedirectandultimateownersdiffersfor40%offoreignaffiliates,involvingcomplexownershipstructureswithinvestmentchainscrossingborders. 4LewellenandRobinson(2014)findthat51%ofUSmultinationalshaveaflatownershipstructureand39%ahighlycomplex one,butobservablefirmcharacteristics,suchassize,age,industry,ordiversification,explainonlyupto37%ofthevariationincomplexityacrossfirms. 5Garcia-Bernardoetal.(2017)showhowdifferentoffshorefinancialcenters(OFCs)areusedincomplexstructureofmultina- tionals’ownershipasconduitorsinkforlocatingcapitalandrevenues.Phillipsetal.(2020)distinguishtwotypesofaffiliatesinOFCs,stand-aloneandin-betweeners,thelaterhavingcontrolofalargeshareofthenetworkofaffiliatesandallowingforaggressivetaxplanningstrategies.SeealsoDamgaardetal.(2019)andDelatteetal.(2022)forevidenceoftheroleoft