国家中期财政结构计划的执行情况：最近的财政发展和2026年预算计划草案

Recent fiscaldevelopmentsand draft budgetary plansfor 2026 Composition of the European Fiscal Board Pieter HasekampChairDirector at the CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Research, the Netherlands Eckhard JanebaMember George KopitsMemberFormer Assistant Director, International Monetary Fund, andfounding Chair, Fiscal Council, MemberAssistant Professor of Economic Policy, University of Udine, Italy; Visiting Professor, College ofEurope; and Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins University Lucía Rodríguez MuñozMemberMember of the Governing Council and the Executive Committee, Bank of Spain For more information about the European Fiscal Board, please visit the following website:European Fiscal Board (EFB)-European Commission This report has been written under the responsibility of the European Fiscal Board with the supportof its secretariat.Please quote as: EuropeanFiscalBoard (2026) The implementation ofnational medium-term fiscal-structural plans:Recent fiscaldevelopmentsand draftbudgetaryplans for 2026, Brussels. Comments on the report should be sent to: Secretariat of the European Fiscal BoardEuropean CommissionRue de la Loi 200Office BERL 02/3521049 BrusselsBelgium Email:EFB-SECRETARIAT@ec.europa.eu Cut-off date:18February 2026 The opinions expressed in thisdocument are the sole responsibility of the European Fiscal Boardand do not necessarily reflect the views and positions of institutions with which the Board membersare affiliated or for which they work. alower degree of detailpotentially opening thedoor to morediscretion. The need for atimelierex post assessment isreinforcedbythecurrenteconomicenvironment.Public financesin several EU andeuro area Member Statesare under increasingstrain, marked by very high debt levels, growingpressure on public spendingand significantuncertainty arising from geopolitical shifts. Theconsistent and credible application of the EU’sfiscalframework,including its margins offlexibility,is paramount to safeguarding thelong-term sustainability of public finances, Pieter Hasekamp Chair of the European FiscalBoard (EFB) Foreword I am pleased to introduce thisEFBreportontheimplementation of the first vintage of The report marks a pivotal moment for theEFB,signallingthe launch of a newandmorefrequentreporting strategy.This change isdictatedby our new mandate, which has giventhe EFB a strengthened role and requires us toprovidea“timely ex post evaluation of the The assessment of the 2026draft budgetaryplanstakes place against a backdrop ofmoderate yet resilient economic growth acrossthe euro areaand the EU. Projections indicate amodestacceleration of real GDP in 2026,primarilysupported by robust domesticdemand, strong labour markets, and easinginflationarypressures.This resilience is,however,challengedbystructural The new approachalsoenables us to delivermore effectively on ourgeneralobjective. Likemost fiscal watchdogs, the EFB is not involvedin thedecision-makingofthe Member States’budget cycle. Our advisory role is focused onscrutinising the implementation of the EU’sfiscalframework bythe Commission andtheCouncil.However, atimelierex post assessment Contents 1.Introduction.................................................................................................................7 Glossary...............................................................................................................................49 Key messages and recommendations •The Commission and theCouncilrecently agreeda newCode of Conduct, amutualunderstandingon howto operationalisegeneral provisions of the reformed EU fiscal rules.Upfront,thiswasan •Whenmonitoring therecommended country-specificnetexpenditure paths, theCommissionapplied a mechanical assessment of compliance.As a result,thecompliancelabelsare difficult tointerpret without further qualifications.Most importantly,in some casestheydonotsignalprocedural consequenceseven if the highlighted risk of non-compliancewere tomaterialise. •The Commission’s compliance assessment does not monitor the reform and investmentcommitments of countries that were granted extended adjustment periods. This is a notable gap,as (i) these commitments are the actual counterpartto higher net expenditure growth and, in turn, •The new regime’s net expenditure indicator relies on forecasts and estimates even after outturndatafor total government expenditure are available.Differences between national and •More generally, the Commission’s approachto assessing prospective compliancemay not beconsistentwitha key objective of the 2024 reformnamelytoshift towardsarisk-based, country-specificsurveillance asmeans to effectivelysafeguard fiscal sustainability. Compliancelabelsshould more consistently take into accountoverall conditions of public financesand thecredibility •In 2025,theCommissioninvited Member States to apply forthenational escape clausetoenhancethe EU's military capabilities.The2025autumnsurveillanceround confirmsaninterpret