TheRiskinessofCreditOriginsandDownsideRiskstoEconomicActivity PreparedbyClaudioRaddatz,DulaniSeneviratne,JérômeVandenbussche,PeichuXie,andYizhiXu WP/24/72 IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement 2024 MAR ©2024InternationalMonetaryFundWP/24/72 IMFWorkingPaper MonetaryandCapitalMarketsDepartment TheRiskinessofCreditOriginsandDownsideRiskstoEconomicActivity PreparedbyClaudioRaddatz,DulaniSeneviratne,JérômeVandenbussche,PeichuXie,andYizhiXu* AuthorizedfordistributionbyDavidHofmanMarch2024 IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement. ABSTRACT:Weconstructacountry-levelindicatorcapturingtheextenttowhichaggregatebankcreditgrowthoriginatesfrombankswitharelativelyriskierprofile,whichwelabeltheRiskinessofCreditOrigins(RCO). Usingbank-leveldatafrom42countriesovermorethantwodecades,wedocumentthatRCOvariationsovertimeareafeatureofthecreditcycle.RCOalsorobustlypredictsdownsideriskstoGDPgrowthevenaftercontrollingforaggregatebankcreditgrowthandfinancialconditions,amongotherdeterminants.RCO’sexplanatorypowercomesfromitsrelationshipwithassetquality,investorandbankingsectorsentiment,aswellasfuturebankingsectorresilience.Ourfindingsunderscoretheimportanceofbankheterogeneityfortheoriesofthecreditcycleandfinancialstabilitypolicy. RECOMMENDEDCITATION:ClaudioRaddatz,DulaniSeneviratne,JeromeVandenbussche,PeichuXie,andYizhiXu,«TheRiskinessofCreditOriginsandDownsideRiskstoEconomicActivity”,IMFWorkingPaperNo.24/72(2024) JELClassificationNumbers: E44,E47,G01,G21,G28 Keywords: Privatesectordebt;creditgrowth;creditorigin;creditcycle;banksoundness;creditrisk;financialvulnerability;investorsentiment;financialstability Authors’emailaddresses: clraddatz@fen.uchile.cl;dseneviratne@IMF.org;jvandenbussche@IMF.org;xiepeichu@gmail.com;yxu@IMF.org *ClaudioRaddatz(UniversidaddeChile);DulaniSeneviratne,JérômeVandenbussche,andYizhiXu(InternationalMonetary WORKINGPAPERS TheRiskinessofCreditOriginsandDownsideRiskstoEconomicActivity PreparedbyClaudioRaddatz,DulaniSeneviratne,JérômeVandenbussche,PeichuXie,andYizhiXu1 1TheauthorswouldliketothankTobiasAdrianaswellasparticipantsataseminarattheIMFandthe2023RIDGEconference Contents Acronyms/Glossary3 I.Introduction4 II.TheoreticalUnderpinningsandFurtherLinkstotheLiterature6 III.RiskinessOfCreditOriginsMeasurementandSamplesConstruction8 IV.RiskinessOfCreditOriginsandDownsideRiskstoGrowth13 V.WhyDoesRCOPredictDownsiderisks?ExploringtheChannels15 VI.Conclusion20 References22 Acronyms/Glossary BLSBankLendingStandards CACurrentAccount EDFExpectedDefaultFrequency FCIFinancialConditionsIndex GDPGrossDomesticProduct GFCGlobalFinancialCrisis GUOGlobalUltimateOwner IFSInternationalFinancialStatistics LLPLoanLossProvisions OLSOrdinaryLeastSquares NPLNonperformingLoans RCARiskinessofCreditAllocation RCORiskinessofCreditOrigins I.Introduction Abundantempiricalevidencesupportstheviewthatperiodsoflargeaggregatecreditexpansionstendtobefollowedbyadversemacroeconomicoutcomesandtheoccurrenceoffinancialcrises(Jordaetal.2011,SchularickandTaylor2012,Mianetal.2018,amongothers),especiallywhenthecreditexpansiontakesplaceinanenvironmentofeasyfinancialconditionsandbuoyantcreditsentiment(KrishnamurthyandMuir2017,López-Salidoetal.2017,Kirti2021,Adrianetal.2022,Greenwoodetal.2022).However,existingcross-countryempiricalstudiesfocusonaggregatemeasuresofthevolumeandpriceofcreditandleaveasidetherolethatthecompositionofcreditoriginationandlenderheterogeneitymayplayinaggregaterisk-takingandfinancialstability. Anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatfasterbank-levelcreditgrowthduringaboomisassociatedwithworseperformanceduringtheensuingbustandthatthestrengthoffinancialinstitutionsdrivingtheexpansionmattersforfutureaggregateoutcomes.DuringtheGlobalFinancialCrisis(GFC),severaliconicfailureswerefinancialintermediariesthathadfollowedaveryaggressiveexpansionstrategy.IntheUnitedStates,CountrywideFinancialandWashingtonMutualbecamethefirstandthirdlargestmortgageoriginatorsoverashortperiodbeforethecrisis,lostbillionsonsubprimeexposures,andhadtoberesolvedin2008(UnitedStatesSenate,2010).Spanishsavingsbanks,whichwereattheepicenteroftheSpanishbankingcrisisadecadeago,hadexperiencedacontinuousriseintheirloanmarketshareintherun-uptothecrisis(Santos,2018).Anglo-IrishBank,theonlyIrishbanknationalizedduringtheIrishbankingcrisisof2008-2010,hadthefastestpre-crisiscreditgrowthamongmajorIrishbanks(ReglingandWatson,2010).Goingfurtherbackintime,duringthecreditboominFinlandandSwedenintheearly1990s,themostaggressivelendersweretheweakestincapitalizationandunderlyingprofitability(EnglundandVihriala,2010). Theoreticalmodelsoffinancialamplificationandfinancialcriseshavelongrecognizedth