人民币在跨境支付中的使用：区域模式以及掉期额度和离岸清算银行的作用（英）

RenminbiUsageinCross-BorderPayments:RegionalPatternsandtheRoleofSwapLinesandOffshoreClearingBanks HectorPerez-SaizandLongmeiZhang WP/23/77 IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate. TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement. 2023 MAR ©2023InternationalMonetaryFundWP/23/77 IMFWorkingPaper Strategy,Policy,andReviewDepartment RenminbiUsageinCross-BorderPayments:RegionalPatternsandtheRoleofSwapsLinesandOffshoreClearingBanks PreparedbyHectorPerez-SaizandLongmeiZhang* AuthorizedfordistributionbyMartinČihák March2023 IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement. ABSTRACT:ThepaperexaminestheusageoftheRenminbi(RMB)asaninternationalpaymentcurrency.Globally,theuseofRMBremainssmall,accountingfor2percentoftotalcross-bordertransactions.Usingcountry-leveltransactiondatafromSwift**for2010–21,wefindsignificantregionalvariationsintheuseofRMBforcross-borderpayments.WhileRMBislittleusedinsomeregions,ithasgainedtractioninothers,andthesecross-countrydifferenceshavewidenedovertheyears.Suchdifferencescanbepartlyexplainedbyaneconomy’sgeographicdistance,politicaldistance,andtradelinkageswithChina.However,italsoreflectstheimpactofpolicymeasuresbythePeople’sBankofChina,includingestablishingbilateralswaplinesandoffshoreclearingbanks.BothpolicymeasureshelpedtoaddressoffshoreRMBliquidityshortagesgivenChina’soverallcapitalaccountrestrictions,withtheoffshoreclearingbankshavingaquantitativelylargerimpact.OuranalysiscontributestoabetterunderstandingofthegrowingimportanceofRMBwithintheinternationalmonetarysystem. RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Perez-SaizandZhang(2023) JELClassificationNumbers: E42;F33 Keywords: RMBinternationalization;Swift;Swaplines;OffshoreClearingBanks Authors’E-MailAddresses: HPerez-Saiz@imf.org;LZhang2@imf.org *TheauthorswouldliketothankRoshanIyerforoutstandingresearchassistance,andHelgeBerge,MartinČihák,DongHe,Astrid Thorsen,andFabiánValenciaforveryhelpfulcomments. **DatarelatingtoSwiftmessagingflowsispublishedwithpermissionofS.W.I.F.T.SCRLSWIFT©2023undera‘BIPartnership’framework.Becausefinancialinstitutionshavemultiplemeanstoexchangeinformationabouttheirfinancialtransactions,Swiftstatisticsdonotrepresentcompletemarketorindustrystatistics.Swiftdisclaimsallliabilityforanydecisionbased,infullorinpart,onSwiftstatistics,andfortheirconsequences. WORKINGPAPERS RenminbiUsageinCross-BorderPayments:RegionalPatternsandtheRoleofSwapLinesandOffshoreClearingBanks PreparedbyHectorPerez-SaizandLongmeiZhang1 1Theauthor(s)wouldliketothankRoshanIyerforoutstandingresearchassistance,andHelgeBerge,MartinČihák,DongHe,AstridThorsen,andFabiánValenciaforveryhelpfulcomments. Contents Introduction3 RegionalPatternsofRMBCross-BorderPayments7 RegionalPoliciesthatFacilitateRMBInternationalization9 BilateralSwapLines9 OffshoreClearingBanks11 EmpiricalStudy13 Conclusion16 AnnexI.DataSources17 AnnexII.ListofSwapLines18 References19 FIGURES 1.China’sRapidIntegrationvs.LimitedFinancialIntegration3 2.CapitalAccountOpennessbyIncomeLevel4 3.EvolutionofRMBCross-BorderPayments7 4.GeographicalDistributionofRMBPayments(2021)8 6.OutstandingBilateralSwapLines(2021)10 7.ExampleofFunctioningofCentralBankBilateralSwapLine11 8.RMBOffshoreClearingBanks12 TABLES 1.RolesofanInternationalCurrency5 2.RegressionsResultsforTransfers(MessagesMT103andMT202)15 3.RegressionsResultsforTrade-relatedPayments(MessagesMT400andMT700)16 Introduction Overthepastfourdecades,rapideconomicgrowthhastransformedChinafromoneofthepoorestcountriesintheworldtothesecondlargesteconomythataccountsforone-thirdofglobalgrowth(IMF,2018).TheWTOentryin2001hasspurredChina’srapidtradeintegrationandreshapedglobalsupplychains.However,despiteitseconomicsuccessandclosetradetieswiththerestoftheworld,China’sfinancialintegrationismuchmorelimited.Itsinternationalassetsandliabilitiesconstituteonlyfourpercentoftheworldexternalassetsandliabilities,comparedto13percentinglobaltrade1.Inthiscontext,theinternationaluseofChina’scurrencyRMBisalsominimal,accountingfortwopercentofallglobalcross-borderpayments2and3percentofcentralbankreserveassets3(Figure1). Figure1.China’sRapidIntegrationvs.LimitedFinancialIntegration China'sslowfinancialintegrationislargelytheresultoftheChinesegovernment'sdecisiontomaintainaclosedcapitalaccount.SincethefalloftheBrettonWoodssystemin1973,manycountrieshaveswitchedtowardflexibleexchangeratesandopencapitalaccounts,resultinginanincreaseinthesizeandvolatilityofcross-borderfinancialflows.Today,mostadvancedeconomieshavefullyliberalizedtheircapitalaccounts,whileemergingmarketsandlow-incomecountrieshaveretainedcertainrestrictionsnotwithstandingpartialliberalization.Incomparison,Chinahasmaintainedstrongcapitalaccountlimitsfordecades,withamuchtightercontrolo