2023年的世界：塑造国际议程的十个问题（英）

ISSN:2013-4428 https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2022/283/en CIDOBnotes internacionals 283 DECEMBER 2022 THEWORLDIN2023:Tenissuesthatwillshapetheinternationalagenda TextfinalisedonDecember15,2022.ThisNotaInternacionalistheproductofcollectivereflectionbyCIDOB’sresearchteamincollaborationwithEsadeGeo.CoordinatedandeditedbyCarmeColomina,itincludescontributionsfromInésArco,AnnaAyuso,JordiBacaria,AnaBallesteros,PaulaBarceló,PolBargués,MoussaBourekba,VictorBurguete,AnnaBusquets,CarmenClaudín,AnnaEstrada,FrancescFàbregues,OriolFarrés,AgustíFernándezdeLosada,MartaGalceran,MatteoGaravoglia,BlancaGarcés,PatriciaGarcía-Durán,SeánGolden,BertaGüell,JosepM9Lloveras,RicardoMartínez,EstherMasclans,ÓscarMateos,SergioMaydeu,PolMorillas,VivianeOgou,FrancescoPasetti,CristinaSala,HéctorSánchez,ÁngelSaz,ReinhardSchweitzer,AntoniSegura,CristinaSerrano,EduardSoleriLecha,MarieVandendriesscheandPereVilanova,whiletheworkofotherCIDOBmemberswasvitaltoitspreparation. Limits,bothindividualandcollective,willbetestedin2023,whetheritbein-flation,foodsecurity,theenergycrisis,risingpressureonglobalsupplychainsandgeopoliticalcompetition,interna-tionalsecurityandgovernancesystemsbreakingdown,andthecollectivecapa-citytorespondtoitall. Theimpactsofthispermacrisiscontri-butedirectlytoworseninghouseholdlivingconditions,whichtranslateintorisingsocialunrestandcitizenprotests,whichwillonlyincrease.Cracksarewideninganddeepening–geopolitical,socialandintheaccesstobasicgoods. ThewarinUkrainehasmadeitclearthatthemorerisksareassociatedwithageostrategicconfrontation,themoreobsoletethecollectivesecurityfra-meworksbuilttodealwiththemap-pear.Themismatchbetweenmeans,challengesanddeterrenceinstrumentsworsens. I n2023,limits,bothindividualandcollective,willbetested,whetheritbeinflation,foodsecurity,theenergycrisis,risingpressureonglobalsupply chainsandgeopoliticalcompetition,internationalsecurityandgovernancesystemsbreakingdown,andthecollectivecapacitytorespondtoitall.Russia’sinvasionofUkrainewastheunexpectedscenarioof2022thatbecamedecisivebecauseitacceleratedtheerosionofthepost-1945order.However,thetruescopeanddepthofthewar’sglobalimpactisonlystartingtobecomeclear.Wefacenotonlyacrisisofenormousdimensions,butanewprocessofstructuralchangewhoseendremainsunknowable. Likethewhiteballonapooltable,thewarinUkrainehasgivennewmomentumtovarioustransformationsandcrisesthatwerealreadyunderway,whichthenbegancollidingwitheachother,increasingthesenseofglobaldisorderandacceleration,ofgeopoliticaluncertainty,andofsocialupheaval.WherewilltheballstriggeredbythewarinUkrainestop?Whatlevelofdisorderwillprevailwhentheydo?Ofallthemanycrises,whichcouldbetheblackballthatdropsintothepockettoosoonandproducesanewexistentialthreat?Aboveall,ascontinuousvulnerabilityanduncertaintybecomethenewnormal,whatcollectiveresponsesarebeingbuilt? LikeaVenndiagram,allthesewar-acceleratedchangesoverlapandintertwine,somedrivenbynecessity,othersbynewgeopoliticallogics.Wefaceconflictsthatintersect,andtransitionsthatseemedtobeworkinghandinhandtobuildamoresustainableworldnowmomentarilycolliding.Thatiswhyin 2023thepermacrisis–wordoftheyear2022–rangesfromWesternpowers’strategicdisorientationtothevulnerabilitymanyoftheworld’speoplefeelduetotherisingpricesofbasicproductsandtheinabilitytoprotectcommongoodslikefood,energyandtheclimate.Fragilityispervasive,fromcollectivesecuritytoindividualsurvival. Itremainstobeseenif2023willbetheyearofescalation –intentionaloraccidental–orthetimetocementsmallde-escalationsthatreducegeopoliticaltensionsandtheireconomicimpact.But2022hasshownusthatthegreatertherisks,themoreobsoletearetheregulatoryframeworksandprotectionsystemsthatshouldprotectusagainstsomuchvolatility. 1.Strategiccompetitionaccelerates ThewarinUkrainehasacceleratedtheschismandconfrontationbetweenthemajorglobalpowers.ArmshavebecomeanotherpointoftensioninUS–Chinarelations,joiningtrade,technological,economicandgeostrategiccompetition.Thiswillonlybeaccentuatedin2023.Buttheworldbeforeusisnotdividedintotwowatertightblocs.Rather,afull-scalereconfigurationofalliancesisunderway,whichforcesallotheractorstorepositionthemselvesinrelationtothenewstrategiccompetitiondynamicsandtoseekouttheirownspacesinatransformationthatisglobal,butwhoseepicentrein2023willremaininEurope. Rivalryisnolongeratabooconcept–itisseenasthenewstateofrelationsbetweenthegreatpowers.However,manygovernmentswouldrathernotchoosesidesinthisChina–USbipolarityandprefertomaintainfluidrelationsindifferentaspectsoftheliberalinternationalorderinordertotakeadvantageoftheopportunitiesthatemergefromthegreatpowercompetition,accordingtotheirnationalinterests.So,2023willalsobetheyearoftheothers–whenwewillmoreclearlyseeanaccelerationinotherpowers’strategiccompetitiontogainprominencewhilekeepingspacesforcooperationopenwiththeUnitedStates,aswellaswithChinaandRussia.ItwillbeayeartopayattentiontothestrategiesofIndiaandTurkey,theevolutionofSaudiArabia,andthechangesthatmayemergefromLuladaSilva’sBrazilandLatinAmerica’smostrecentelectoralcycle–whereChinahasconsolidateditsweightandinflu