中国可以从日本的经历中汲取哪些经验（第二部分）：参考日本应对不良贷款问题的方式

2016年10月21日 亚洲经济分析 Research Report中国可以从日本的经历中汲取哪些经验(第二部分)：参考日本应对不良贷款问题的方式 日本的不良贷款问题  日本资产泡沫破裂后信贷余额却仍保持在高位。在这一时期出现了僵尸企业受到“常青贷款”资助、而其他企业却面临信贷紧张的现象。经济活动停滞、不良贷款上升。  在此情况下政府需要及时出手采取行动，因为日本银行业有财务方面的动力来推迟不良贷款处置。但将纳税人资金用于企业再融资遇到了强大的政治阻力，因此政府最初的反应是采取宽容的监管机制。直到2002年政府才终于采取了果断措施。 从日本汲取的经验教训  银行不应基于乐观的资产价格前景预测而延迟不良贷款的确认和处置。  政府需要建立一套稳健的监督框架，包括在危机发生前央行应被赋予展开督查并采取其他行动解决资金短缺问题的权力。  政府和银行都应加强自律和治理。  再融资举措需要解决声誉问题。  宏观经济应实现复苏以避免经济陷入恶性循环。 对于中国当前的参考意义  目前中国企业的债务增速比日本泡沫时期还要快。国有企业产能过剩/杠杆问题十分堪忧。这其中可能包括大量的僵尸企业。虽然向国有企业的信贷快速增长，但向民营企业的信贷却趋于紧张而且实际上已导致杠杆温和下降。  越来越多迹象显示，这些问题正在影响着中国的金融体系。虽然官方公布的银行不良贷款率不到2%，但我们中国金融业研究团队估算的实际不良贷款率为8-9%。中国银行业的影子银行产品敞口也快速上升。中国可从日本不良贷款问题中汲取经验，例如应采取更主动的方式确认和处置不良贷款等。 Naohiko Baba +81 (3) 6437-9960 | naohiko.baba@gs.com Goldman Sachs Japan Co., Ltd. Andrew Tilton +852-2978-1802 | andrew.tilton@gs.com 高盛（亚洲）有限责任公司 Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC certificationand other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to www.gs.com/research/hedge.html. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Investment Research With concerns emerging in China about excess capital stock and debt, it could learneconomic policy lessons from Japan’s experience after the economic bubble burst inthe early 1990s, in our view. We began this series of reports by looking at similaritiesand differences between Japan and China’s economies (“Lessons for China fromJapan’s experience (part 1): Exploring similarities and differences”, Asia EconomicsAnalyst, September 12, 2016). In this second report, we attempt to draw possiblelessons for present-day China from Japan’s post-bubble experience in dealing withthe non-performing loan (NPL) problems after the debt boom.Our preceding analysis showed similarities between Japan in the late 1980s/early1990s and present-day China in terms of demographic trends, subsequent decline inlong-term growth rate and saving rates, and reduced reliance on exports precededby the significant appreciation of the country’s currency. On the other hand, China’sglobal presence is still growing and its current per-capita GDP, urbanization ratio, andhuman capital, among others, have only just reached the same level as Japan in the1960-1970s, suggesting there is still considerable room for further economicdevelopment. At the same time, China has accumulated debt at a faster pace inrecent years, particularly in the corporate sector, than Japan did during its bubbleperiod. We therefore think now is the time, when China still has ample capacity todo so, to decisively tackle the problems of excess capital stock and NPLs.As shown by Japan’s experience after the collapse of the bubble, there is a tendencyfor fundamental solutions to problems such as NPLs to be put off due to theconsiderable pain involved amid prevailing optimistic outlook of asset prices. In themeantime, however, these problems tend to worsen steadily below the surface, andthe costs of dealing with them can ultimately wind up being much greater than ifthey were addressed as soon as they arose. This occurred in Japan chiefly throughthe adverse feedback loop between the financial sector and the real economy.Why did it take nearly 10 years from the collapse of the bubble untilthe financial crisis in Japan?Japan’s economy experienced a large asset bubble just before the demographicbonus peaked (see Exhibit 1).1.With demographic trends providing a strong tailwindfor the economy, it was a period conducive to more bullish behavior by economicagents such as banks, corporations, and investors. Furthermore, the Bank of Japan(BOJ) provided increasingly strong impetus by continuously lowering its policy ratesto boost domestic demand in response to the sharp appreciation of the yen in thewake of the 1985 Plaza Accord. The equity market rallied strongly and land pricessoared, as banks were leaning toward risky real estate lending.1.The demographic dividend in Exhibit 1 is defined as the working age population (15-64 years old)divided by the dependent population (all other age groups). When the demographic dividend is rising(falling), this is known as a demographic bonus (onus). When the economy is in a demographic bonusphase, demographic trends are a tailwind for the economy, mainly due to benefits from expandedproduction capacity thanks to the increase in total labor force and a reduced social burden generated bythe dependent population. In contrast, when an economy enters a demographic onus, the mechanism isreversed, and demographic trends become a strong headwind. For details, see Baba, Ota, and Tilton,“Lessons for China from Japan’s experience (part 1): Exploring similarities and differences”, AsiaEconomics Analyst, September 12, 2016.21 October 2016Page 2Goldman SachsAsia Economics Analyst It should be noted here, however, that even after the bursting of the equity bubble inthe late 1980s and the land price bubble in the early 1990s, credit balances did notfall, but in