CIDOB Opinion 694 discusses the increasing use of migration as a political weapon at the European Union's external borders. This phenomenon has been exemplified through actions taken by Turkey, Morocco, and now Belarus.
Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, sought increased financial aid for hosting refugees and support for military operations in Syria. Morocco reacted to the hospitalization of Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front, demanding collusion on issues related to Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara. Belarus, with Russian support, has orchestrated the arrival of thousands of refugees at the borders of Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania as a response to EU sanctions.
The EU perceives these actions as a 'blackmail', labeling the arrival of thousands of people as a significant 'security' threat and threatening to declare itself 'at war'. This response involves deploying national armies at borders, using force, and responding with unity. However, the EU's actions are self-criticized as it is a victim of its own policies.
Firstly, the EU overreacts due to fears of migration crises, guaranteeing the success of blackmail. The number of people isn't the primary concern; it's the fear it instills in both the electorate and governments.
Secondly, the EU's outsourcing of border control to neighboring states has created a situation where these states can dictate terms in exchange for control, often leading to the imposition of their conditions.
Thirdly, the EU's main focus is on raising awareness among migrants rather than addressing the root causes of migration, such as chronic poverty and conflict. The EU prefers blaming foreign governments for exploiting migrants' naivety rather than recognizing the need for protection and decent living conditions.
Lastly, declarations of war lead to states of emergency, where fundamental rights are suspended, military force is unlimited, and access to areas is restricted, often seen in Greece and during push-backs that violate national and EU laws.
CIDOB Opinion suggests that the fear of another migration crisis has led the EU to accept the unacceptable, making it vulnerable to pressure from third states and the violation of fundamental rights. The author argues that this could potentially signal the end of European liberalism, not because of the migration crises themselves, but because of the consequences they produce.