CEO离职风险与企业环境绩效（英）

BISWorkingPapers No1190 CEOturnoverriskandfirmenvironmentalperformance byGiulioCornelli,MagdalenaErdemandEgonZakrajšek MonetaryandEconomicDepartment May2024 JELclassification:D22,G30,G34,O31,Q55. Keywords:corporatefinance,ESG,emissions,environmentalinnovation,short-terminism. BISWorkingPapersarewrittenbymembersoftheMonetaryandEconomicDepartmentoftheBankforInternationalSettlements,andfromtimetotimebyothereconomists,andarepublishedbytheBank.Thepapersareonsubjectsoftopicalinterestandaretechnicalincharacter.TheviewsexpressedinthemarethoseoftheirauthorsandnotnecessarilytheviewsoftheBIS. ThispublicationisavailableontheBISwebsite(www.bis.org). ©BankforInternationalSettlements2024.Allrightsreserved.Briefexcerptsmaybereproducedortranslatedprovidedthesourceisstated. ISSN1020-0959(print) ISSN1682-7678(online) CEOturnoverriskandfirmenvironmentalperformance∗ GiulioCornelliMagdalenaErdemEgonZakrajšek May2024 Abstract WeinvestigatetherelationshipbetweentheprobabilityofaCEOforced-turnoverandfirmperformanceonseveralenvironmentaldimensions.OurfindingssuggestthatahigherriskofbeingterminatedfortheCEOiscorrelatedwithaloweren-vironmentalranking,particularlyonenvironmentalinnovationactivities,andmoreESGcontroversiesforthefirm.TheinclusionofESG-payclausesinexecutives’com-pensationpackagesonlymarginallyoffsetssuchdeterioration.LookingatdataonGreenhousegas(GHG)emissions,weconsistentlyfindthatariseintheprobabilityofbeingterminatedcorrespondstoanincreaseinscope2and3emissions(“carbonleakeage”),whereasscope1emissionsremainunchanged.Throughaninstrumentalvariableapproach,wetracethedeteriorationoffirms’ESGcontroversies-andenvi-ronmentalinnovationscorestoastrategicalre-orientationtowardsshort-terminism. JELClassification:D22G30G34O31Q55 Keywords:corporatefinance,ESG,emissions,environmentalinnovation,short-terminism ∗GiulioCornelli(giulio.cornelli@bis.org)isattheBankforInternationalSettlementsandtheUniver- sityofZurich,MagdalenaErdem(magdalena.erdem@bis.org)isattheBankforInternationalSettlementsandEgonZakrajšek(Egon.Zakrajsek@bos.frb.org)isattheFederalReserveBankofBoston.WethankOlimpiaCarradori,TheaKolasa,TommasoOliviero,ZachariasSautnerandAlexanderWagnerfortheirusefulcommentsandsuggestions.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheBankforInternationalSettlements,theFederalReserveBankofBostonorUniversityofZurich. 1Introduction The2015ParisAgreementestablishedalong-termgoalofkeepingtheriseinglobalaveragetemperaturesbelow2oCabovepre-industriallevels.Changesinindividuals’preferencesandconsumptionbehavioursalonewillfallshortofachievingthishigh-priorityobjective.RecentworkbyBouckaertetal.(2021)showedthatlessthan5%ofthereductioninCO2emissionsby2050willoriginatefrombehaviouralchanges.Ontheotherhand,theyestimatethat55%willcomefromtechnologyalreadyincommerceinthemarket,andtheresidual45%frominnovation.Suchahigh-orderchallengehighlightsevenmoreprominentlythepivotalrolethatfirms’researchanddevelopment(R&D)activitieswillplayingreeningtheeconomyandcallsforashiftinfirms’culturewhensettingtheirstrategies.Furthermore,therecentwaveofrecord-hightemperaturesinthesummerof2023hashighlightedevenmoreprominentlythepriorityofachievingthisobjective,andgiventhescaleofthechallengeanycontribution,evenifsmall,shouldn’tbeleftunexplored. Achievingtheseresultsisnotonlyapriorityfroma“macro-societal”perspectivebutoffersconsiderablebenefitsatthemicro-firmleveltoo.Indeed,consistentlywithinvestorsandfinancialintermediariesinternalizingtheimportanceofthegreentransition(Kruegeretal.,2020),greenerfirmsborrowatcheaperrates(Degryseetal.,2023),havealoweroverallcostofcapital(Chava,2014),donothavetocorrespondapremiumtoinvestorsfortheirexposuretocarbonemissionrisk(BoltonandKacperczyk,2021),andarelessfinanciallyconstrained(Olivieroetal.,2024)relativetobrownerones. Sustainableandlong-lastingimprovementsinfirm’senvironmentalresultsmayrequireashiftoffocustowardsthelong-term,whereasmanagementincentivescouldattimesbetiltedinfavourofshorter-termreturns.Thisfriction,alsocalledtragedyofthehorizon(seeCarney(2015)),canbeparticularlyacuteforChiefExecutiveOfficers(CEO)whentheriskofaforcedturnoverbecomeshigher. Inthispaper,weinvestigatetherelationshipbetweentheprobabilityofaCEOforced-turnover,aprominentsourceofriskforCEOs(PetersandWagner,2014;Jenterand Kanaan,2015;Elluletal.,2020),andfirmperformancealongseveralenvironmentaldimensions.Inotherwords,whenCEOsfaceahigherprobabilityofbeingunwillinglyterminated,dotheykeeppursuingenvironmentalobjectives,whicharetypicallymorelong-terminnature?Orconversely,dotheyre-focusthestrategytowardshort-termobjectivestoconsolidatetheirposition? Toanswerthesequestions,weassembleanoveldatabasecombiningindicatorsonCEOcharacteristicsandexposuretotheriskofaforcedturnover,andonfirms’financials,ex-pecteddefaultfrequencies,andESGandenvironmentalperformance.OurmethodologytoestimatetheprobabilityofaCEOforced-turnoverbuildsontheresultsfromPetersandWagner(2014).Specifically,weobtainthefittedvaluesfromaprobitregressionof ForcedTurnover,adumm