WTO解散对发展经济的影响（英）

Theimpactondevelopingeconomiesof WTOdissolution April2024 Tableofcontents Tableofcontents2 ExecutiveSummary3 1.Introduction6 2.Modellingassumptions8 2.1Scenariodefinition8 2.2Modellingapproach10 3.Economicimpactresults11 3.1Impactontradeflows11 3.2Impactonforeigndirectinvestment12 3.3Impactonproductivitylevels12 3.4ImpactonGDP13 AppendixI:Methodology15 AppendixII:Bibliography19 ExecutiveSummary OxfordEconomicshavebeencommissionedbytheInternationalChamberofCommerce(ICC)toprovideanindependentassessmentofthepotentialimpactofWTOdissolutionondevelopingeconomies(middle-incomeandlow-incomecountries).Thisreportdetailsourfindingsandtheassumptionsunderpinningouranalysis. Scenariodefinition Anumberofscenarioscouldbeenvisagedthatwouldresultintheabandonmentoftherules-basedmultilateraltradingsystemandWTOdissolution.Allwouldentailnegativerepercussionsforglobaltrade,butthelevelofseverityvariesconsiderablydependingonthespecificassumptionsemployed.Forexample,aseverebutplausiblescenariocouldinvolveaglobaltradewarresultinginpolicy-drivengeoeconomicfragmentation;attheoppositeendofthespectrum,alessextremescenarioforWTOdissolutioncouldinvolveamoregradualerosionoftrusteventuallyresultinginabreakdownofmembers’commitmentstotherules-basedsystem.Wehavetakenaconservativeapproachtodemonstrateourhypothesis thatevena“bestcase”scenarioforWTOdissolutionwouldhavesubstantialnegativerepercussionsfordevelopingeconomiesthatrelyontradeasacriticalenablerofgrowth. Inourscenario,thedemiseoftherules-basedmultilateraltradingsystemresultsingreateruncertaintyandhigherinformationcostsforallcountries.Increasedlevelsofprotectionismmayalsobeanticipatedbetweencountrypairswithoutpre-existingfreetradeagreements(FTAs)inplace.ButthisdoesnotimplythatallthebenefitsassociatedwiththeWTOwouldbedestroyed–theworldisnowsocloselyintegratedthroughglobalvaluechains(GVCs)thatincentivestoadoptprotectionistpoliciesarepermanentlyreduced.Rather,weanticipatelevelsofprotectionistpolicybetweencountrypairswithoutFTAswoulddependonlevelsofGVCintegration. ThedirecttradeimpactsofWTOdissolutioninthisscenarioarelimitedtonon-fuelgoods.Weassumemostcountriesthatarereliantonfuelimportswouldnotwishtoraisetradebarriersaffectingtheseinflows1;meanwhile,policycommitmentsundertheWTOtoreducebarrierstotradeinservicesareverylimited–moststudiesfindtheWTOhasnosignificantimpacton servicestradeflowsoutsidethetelecommunicationssector(forwhichthebenefitsassociatedwiththeWTOareunlikelytoberolledbackfollowingdissolutionasdevelopingcountrieswouldcontinuetopushtheirdigitalisationagendatoensurecompetitiveness)2. Thefocusofouranalysisisonthepotentiallong-termstructuralimpactsofWTOdissolutionondevelopingeconomies.Thisisreflectedinthepresentationoftheresults,withmetricsreportedintermsofhowtheycomparetoourbaseline(“statusquo”withtheWTO)forecastsfor2030.OurexpectationisthattheimpactsofWTOdissolutionwouldgraduallyintensifyovertime,withthefullimpactpeakingby2030andremainingpermanent. 1Somegovernmentshaveimposedexportorimportrestrictionsontheseproducts,oftenforgeoeconomicreasons,butweassumethisoutcomeislesslikelyunderthe“conservative”assumptionsofourscenario. 2AlthoughsomerecentstudieshaveindicatedapositivesignificantimpactofWTOcommitmentsonservicestrade,ourfocusondevelopingeconomiesalsomakesitlessrelevantinthecontextofthisstudy. Modellingapproach Inthelong-term,theimpactofWTOdissolutionontheeconomywillbedeterminedbytheextenttowhichitaffectssupply-sidecapacity.Thisisafunctionofthesupplyoflabour,thesizeofthecapitalstockandeconomy-wideproductivitylevels.Keychannelsofimpact(tradeandFDI)directlyaffectdifferentcomponentsofdemand,determiningshort-runchangesinGDP,anddifferentcomponentsofsupply,whichdeterminethelong-runlevelofGDPthatwepresentinourresults. Weusedtheoreticalandempiricalevidencefromacademicliteraturetocalibrate‘input’assumptionsassociatedwithWTOdissolutionthatcouldbeusedwiththeOxfordEconomicsGlobalEconomicModeltodeterminetheultimateimpactonlong-termoutput. -33% Reductionindeveloping countries’non-fueltraderelativetobaseline in2030 Tradeimpactondevelopingcountries WeestimatethatWTOdissolutionwouldlowerexportsofdevelopingcountriesbyaroundathird,comparingtoabaselinewherethe“statusquo”oftherules-basedmultilateraltradingsystemremainsintact.Withinthisgroup,low-incomecountrieswouldbeworstaffected,withexportsreducedbyaround43%by2030(alsocomparedtothisbaseline),whileexportsofmiddle-incomecountrieswouldbeloweredbyaround32%by2030. Thisreductionintradevolumesstemsfrommorerestrictivegovernmentpoliciesaswellasanincreaseintradebarrierslinkedtohigherinformationcostsanduncertainty. Thesubstantialhittoexportsofdevelopingcountriesalsoreflectsthreekeyfactors: 1.Fordevelopingcountries,theWTOcurrentlyprovidesaccesstonewmarketswithlargerandmoredevelopedeconomies,openingupsignificantopportunitiesforexportgrowthanddiversification.ManyofthesebenefitswouldbelostfollowingWTOdissolution. 2.LeastDevelopedCountries(LDCs)alsocurrentlybenefitfrompreferentialtreatment(includingduty-freeandquote-freeaccesstomarketsinsomedevelopedcountries)a