美国经济形势，2023年6月（英）

THEECONOMICSITUATION June2023 BruceYandle Atthis2023midpoint,let’slookattheUSeconomyandseehowithasevolvedfollowingthe2008–2009GreatRecession,theCOVIDpandemic,thestepstakentocushionpandemiceffects,andthentheRussia–UkrainewarandAmerica’songoingwarwithinflation.Justwritingthisfirstsentencecausesmetorealizemorefullythatthesearesurelychallengingtimes.Ofcourse,thelistcouldgoonandincludetheongoingpoliticalstruggleoverthedebtlimitandthecoldwarinvolv-ingChinaandRussia,whicharebothfactorsaffectingthetoneandcharacteroftheeconomy,oneintheveryshortrun—Ihope—theother,longerterm.Butenough! Onreflectingonthelistofshocksandresponsestothem,Ithinkwecanconclude 1.TheUSeconomynowreflectsadominantadministrativestatewhereeverymajorsectorandindustryissubjecttosignificantpoliticaldirectiveandcontrol.Weshouldnolongerspeakofgovernmentinterveningintheprivatesector.Inaveryrealsense,thereisnofree-wheelingprivatesector.Governmentisnowanintegralpartofthefunctioningeconomy. 2.Thecombinationofshocksandresponses,especiallyfromtheGreatRecession,endedwhathadbeenenthusiasticsupportforglobalization.Globalismhasbeenreplacedbynationalism,whichemphasizesdomesticproductionanddeemphasizesinternationaltradebeyondNorthAmericaandlong-standingtradepartners—whatisnowtermednearshoring. 3.USfiscalactionshavesignificantlyenlargedfederaldeficitsanddebtatatimewhenrisinginterestratesthataredesignedtoslowinflationhavecausedtheinterestcostofthefederaldebttobecomeburdensome,especiallywhenpoliticiansseektoexpandgovernmentwelfareactivities. 3434WashingtonBlvd.,4thFloor,Arlington,VA,22201•703-993-4930•www.mercatus.org TheviewspresentedinthisdocumentdonotrepresentofficialpositionsoftheMercatusCenterorGeorgeMasonUniversity. 4.TheFederalReserve’santi-inflationactions,whichhaveledtoarunoffoffederaldebtinstrumentsfromtheFed’sbalancesheet,havecontributedtoasharpdeclineinthemoneysupplyandreduc-tionsinthemarketvalueofbankassets.Thissituationputsvulnerablebanksatgreatriskandpredictsaslowingeconomy. Sincethe2008–2009recession,thecondi-tionsjustsummarizedhavecontributedtoaroller-coastereconomy,withlargerecentswingsinrealGDP(grossdomesticproduct)growth,whichareshowninfigure1.Now,dataforthesecondesti-matefor2023’sfirstquarterindicateanalmostdisappearing1.3percentgrowth,andmostmajorforecasterscallforarecessioninthenextsixtoninemonths.1Theweakfirstquarterperformance wasassociatedwithfallinginventoryinvestments,decliningresidentialconstructionactivity,andlowerimports.Unfortunatelyforinflation-wearyconsumersandtheefforttocurtailinflation,thefirstquarterPersonalConsumptionExpenditureIndexincreased4.2percent,comparedwiththefourthquarter’sincreaseof3.7percent. OtherForecastersArePessimistic TheFederalReserveBankofPhiladelphiasur-veyof37forecastersinFebruaryindicatednega-tiverealGDPgrowthinthisyear’sthirdquarter.2Earlier,aJanuaryWallStreetJournalsurveyof79economistspredictednegativeGDPgrowthin2023’ssecondquarterandthirdquartergrowthatalmostzero.3Inamorerecentsurvey,inApril,thatpanelmovedtherecession’sstarttothethirdquarter.4AndlastNovember,WellsFargoecon- FIGURE1:REALGDPGROWTH,Q42021–Q12023 8 percentchangefrompreviousquarter 6 4 2 0 -2 Q42021Q12022Q22022Q32022Q42022Q12023 Source:BureauofEconomicAnalysis,“GrossDomesticProduct(SecondEstimate),CorporateProfits(PreliminaryEstimate),FirstQuarter2023,”May25,2023,https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product. omistspredictednegativeGDPgrowthforthisyear’sthirdandfourthquarters,arecessionfore-castthathasnotbeenaltered.5 Conversely,inJanuary,theInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)indicatedthattherewasachancetheUnitedStateswouldmissa2023–2024recession,andifaslowdownoccurred,itwouldbemild.6TheIMFturnedmorepessimisticinApril,butitbasicallymaintainedthisforecast.7Inshort,theprospectsfortheyearaheadaresurelybiasedtowardslowergrowth,crossingthelinetobecomerecessionary.Wewillexplorethisandotherthemesmorecarefullyinremainingsections. HowThisReportIsOrganized Thereport’snextsectioncontinuestheforecastdiscussionwithafocusonrecentpronounce-mentsbytheFederalReserve.TheFedrecentlyconcededthepossibilityofarecessioninthenextsixmonthsorso;therationaleofferediswhatisinteresting.Insteadoflookingatitsownefforttoslowtheeconomyortheupsanddownsofstimu-lusspending,theFedlooksattroublesomebankfailures.ThesectionthatfollowscontinuestoputthespotlightontheFedbyasking,“HastheFedgonetoofar?”Thesectiontakesamonetaristapproachandexaminestherelationshipbetweeninflationandgrowthinthemoneysupply.Asindicatedthere,thelikelihoodforlowerinfla-tionishigh,butsoisthelikelihoodforaslowingeconomy. ActionstakenbytheFedtoraiseinterestratesandslowthegrowthoftheeconomyhaveadirecteffectonthevalueofmortgageloansandbondsheldbylendinginstitutionsnationwide.Whenbondsorotherinterest-bearingassetsareonabank’sbalancesheet,interestrateincreasesinfinancialmarketsmakeexistingassetsfallinvaluetoprovideayieldequaltomarketinterest rates.Ifallbankassetsweremarkedtomarket,thenhigherFed-inducedinterestratescoulddoseriousdamagetothevalueofabank’sassets.StepstakenbytheFedtominimizebankclosingsandavoidfinanc