公开您的税务情况

ComingCleanonYourTaxes SebastianBeerandRuuddeMooij WP/23/6 IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate. TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement. 2023 JAN ©2023InternationalMonetaryFundWP/23/6 IMFWorkingPaper FiscalAffairsDepartment ComingCleanonYourTaxesPreparedbySebastianBeerandRuuddeMooij AuthorizedfordistributionbyRuuddeMooijJanuary2023 IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement. ABSTRACT:Thispaperdevelopsasimplemodeltoexplorewhetherahigherdetectionprobabilityforoffshoretaxevaders—e.g.becauseofimprovedexchangeofinformationbetweencountriesand/orduetodigitalizationoftaxadministrations—rendersitoptimalforgovernmentstointroduceavoluntarydisclosureprogram(VDP)and,ifso,underwhatterms.WefindthatiftheVDPisunanticipated,itislikelytobeoptimalforarevenue-maximizinggovernmenttointroduceaVDPwithrelativelygenerousterms,i.e.aloworevennegativepenalty.Whenanticipated,however,theVDPisneitherincentivecompatiblenoroptimal,asitinducesotherwisecomplianttaxpayerstoevadetax.AVDPcanthenonlybebeneficialiftaxevasioninducesanexternalsocialcostbeyondthedirectrevenueforegone,e.g.,duetoadverseeffectsonoveralltaxmorale.IncontrasttothecommonviewthatVDPsshouldcomealongwithadditionalenforcementeffort,wefindthatgovernmentsshouldrelaxenforcementiftheVDPitselfprovidesmorepowerfulincentivestocomeclean. RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Beer,SebastianandRuuddeMooij.2023.“ComingCleanonYourTaxes.”IMFWorkingPaperNo.23/6.InternationalMonetaryFund.WashingtonD.C. JELClassificationNumbers: H26 Keywords: Taxevasion;Voluntarydisclosureprogram;Taxamnesty Author’sE-MailAddress: SBeer@imf.org;RDeMooij@imf.org *Theauthor(s)wouldliketothankFrankvanBrunschot,ElenaD’Agosto,VitorGaspar,TamasKulcsar,StoyanMarkov,RoseNyongesa,RebeccaSparkman,Jean-FrancoisWen,andseminarparticipantsattheIMFforusefulcomments. WORKINGPAPERS ComingCleanonYourTaxes PreparedbySebastianBeerandRuuddeMooij1 1Theauthor(s)wouldliketothankFrankvanBrunschot,ElenaD’Agosto,VitorGaspar,TamasKulcsar,StoyanMarkov,RoseNyongesa,RebeccaSparkman,Jean-FrancoisWen,andseminarparticipantsattheIMFforusefulcomments. Contents I.Introduction3 II.BasicModel8 A.TaxEvasion8 B.OptimalTaxAdministration10 C.ImprovementinDetectionEfficiency11 D.Simulations11 III.UnanticipatedVoluntaryDisclosureProgram13 A.TaxEvasionandVDPParticipation13 B.OptimalPolicyUnderConstantDetectionEfficiency15 C.OptimalPolicyUnderIncreasingDetectionEfficiency18 D.Simulations19 IV.AnticipatedVoluntaryDisclosureProgram21 A.TaxEvasionandVDPParticipation21 B.OptimalVDP24 C.OptimalAdministration25 D.Simulations27 V.Conclusion29 AppendixI.OptimalVDPpenaltyifdetectedevadersareforcedtocomplyinperiod230 A.UnanticipatedVDP30 B.AnticipatedVDP31 AppendixII.ImpactofhigherdetectionefficiencyondetectionprobabilitywithunanticipatedVDP34 AppendixIII.RevenueeffectofanunanticipatedconstrainedVDP35 AppendixIV.LinearapproximationoftheoptimaldetectionprobabilitywithanticipatedVDP36 AppendixV.Extension–AnticipatedVDPoverTperiods38 References40 FIGURES 1.UtilityfromEvasionVersusCompliance9 2.Utilityinperiod2ifp2=p1=p13 3.UtilityinPeriod2ifp2>p115 4.PayoffsfromEnteringanAnticipatedVDP22 TABLES 1.OptimalDetectionProbabilityandShareofTaxEvadersinSteadyState12 2.OptimalUnanticipatedVPDandEnforcementUnderAlternativeParameters20 3.OptimalAnticipatedVPDandEnforcementUnderAlternativeParameters28 I.Introduction Inmanagingthepost-COVIDrecovery,manygovernmentsneedtoimprovetheirrevenueperformance.Raisingmoretaxesfromthemostaffluentinsocietyattractsparticularinterest,asthewealthyhavegenerallyfaredmuchbetterthroughthepandemicthanothers,whichhasamplifiedpre-existinginequality.Inthiscontext,thereisrenewedinterestinvoluntarydisclosureprograms(VDPs)andtaxamnestyprograms(TAPs).Forinstance,Kenya,Nigeria,andSriLankahadtaxamnestyprogramsin2021whileAlbania,Honduras,IndonesiaandTrinidadandTobagoofferedthemin2022.Morecountriesmightfollowinthecomingyears. AVDPallowsprevioustaxevaderstodiscloseinformationabouttheir(offshore)assetsandincomeatreducedpunitiveactionbygovernment.Programsgenerallyimposehigherpaymentobligationsthanwhatisimposedoncomplianttaxpayers(throughinterestandpenalties).However,paymentsandotherpunitivemeasures,suchascriminalprosecution,aregenerallylessthanthoseforevaderswhoaredetected.VDPsvaryintermsofeligibilityandpaymentliability.Theysharesimilaritieswithtaxamnestyprograms(TAPs),whichusuallyforgivethefulltaxliabilityinexchangeforsomefixedpayment.Inthecaseofso-called‘extensiveamnesties’,thispaymentcouldbeevenlowerthantheprincipaltax(Franzoni1996).ThemaingoalofVDPsandTAPsistogenerateadditionalpublicrevenue,bothintheshortandmediumterm.Intheshortrun,revenuegainsarisefromtheimmediateexpansionofthetaxbaseduetoincreasedvoluntarycompli