银行关系与PPP贷款的地理位置（英）

FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries FederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.ISSN1936-2854(Print) ISSN2767-3898(Online) BankRelationshipsandtheGeographyofPPPLending DavidGlancy2023-014 Pleasecitethispaperas: Glancy,David(2023).“BankRelationshipsandtheGeographyofPPPLending,”FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries2023-014.Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2023.014. NOTE:StaffworkingpapersintheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(FEDS)arepreliminarymaterialscirculatedtostimulatediscussionandcriticalcomment.TheanalysisandconclusionssetfortharethoseoftheauthorsanddonotindicateconcurrencebyothermembersoftheresearchstaffortheBoardofGovernors.ReferencesinpublicationstotheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(otherthanacknowledgement)shouldbeclearedwiththeauthor(s)toprotectthetentativecharacterofthesepapers. BankRelationshipsandtheGeographyofPPPLending∗ DavidGlancy†January19,2023 Abstract IstudyhowbankrelationshipsaffectedthetimingandgeographicdistributionofPaycheckProtectionProgram(PPP)lending.Halfofbanks’PPPloanswenttobor-rowerswithin2milesofabranch,mostlydrivenbyrelationshiplending.Firmsnearlessactivelendersshiftedtofintechsandotherdistantlenders,resultingindelaysre-ceivingcreditbutonlyslightlylowerloanvolumes.Iestimateastructuralmodeltofittheobservedrelationshipbetweenbranchdistance,bankPPPactivity,andoriginationtiming.Ifindthatbanksservedrelationshipborrowers5to9daysbeforeotherbor-rowers,aneffectinlinewithreduced-formestimatesusingasampleofPPPborrowerswithpreviousSBAlendingrelationships. ∗Theanalysisandconclusionsinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorandshouldnotbeinterpretedas reflectingtheviewsoftheBoardofGovernorsortheFederalReserveSystem. †FederalReserveBoardofGovernors.Email:David.P.Glancy@frb.gov. 1Introduction AspartoftheCARESAct,thePaycheckProtectionProgram(PPP)providedsmallbusi-nesseswithover$500billioninforgivableloansduringtheearlystagesoftheCOVID-19pandemic.Thesizeandspeedoftherolloutwereunprecedented;mostofthecreditwasextendedduringthefirstmonthoftheprogramdespitenumeroushurdles,includinglast-minutepolicychanges,operationaldifficultiesrelatedtotheeffectsofthepandemic,andtherapidexhaustionoftheinitialfundingallocation.Tomanagethesehurdles,banksreportedlyfocusedonprovidingcredittoexistingcustomers,forwhomlessduediligenceisrequiredbeforelending.Thisbehaviorraisesthequestion:Whathappenedwhenrelationshipcreditwaslessavailable? Inthispaper,IusegeocodeddataonthelocationsofbankbranchesandPPPborrowerstostudythespatialdistributionofPPPloanoriginationsandhowitrelatestooriginationtiming.Asthemajorityofbanks’smallbusinesslendingisconcentratedwithinashortdistanceoftheirbranches,thefocusonpreexistingrelationshipscausedPPPlendingtopredominantlyfallwithinbanks’branchfootprints.StudyingthelocationofPPPlending—andwhathappenswhencreditislessavailablefromlocallenders—isthusinformativeastotherolebankrelationshipsplayedinsupportinglending. Ipresentthreefindingspertainingtotherelationshipbetweenborrowerproximity,bankPPPactivity,andoriginationtiming.First,PPPlendingwashighlylocalized,particu-larlyforrelationship-orientedbanks.1Abouthalfofbankloansoverall,andtwo-thirdsofloansfromrelationship-orientedbanks,wenttoborrowerswithin2milesofabranch.Lessrelationship-orientedbanksdidmorenonlocallending.ThisresultsuggeststhatPPPlendingwaslocalizedbecauseprepandemicsmallbusinesslendingwas.Betweengovernmentguar-anteesremovingtheinformation-basedadvantagesoflocalbanks,andpandemicrestrictionstoon-siteactivitieslimitingthebenefitofbranchaccess,therewaslittlereasontochoose 1Relationship-orientedbanksarebankswherePPPlendingwaslessthanprepandemicsmallbusinesslending.Banksforwhichthisisnotthecaseweremorelikelytohaveexpandedsignificantlybeyondrelationshipborrowers. anearbylenderforaPPPloanabsentanexistingrelationship.Consequently,thedifferentgeographicdistributionofrelationshipandnonrelationshipPPPlendingcanbeexploitedtoexaminethebenefitofbankrelationships. Second,thereisaU-shapedrelationshipbetweenabank’sPPPactivityandtheaveragetimeaborrowerneedstowaittoreceivealoan.ThebanksprovidingtheshortestwaittimesarethosewhosetotalvolumeofPPPlendingwascomparabletothestockofprepandemicsmallbusinessloans.BorrowerstendedtofacelongerdelayswhentheirbankwaslessactiveinPPP(indicatingbank-specificlendingfrictions)orveryhighlyactive(meaningahighshareofborrowerswerenotexistingclients). Third,borrowerswhoobtainedPPPloansfromnearbylendersreceivedcreditearlier,particularlyiftheirlenderwasmoreactiveintheprogram.Activebankspredominantlyservednearbyborrowersearlyintheprogrambeforemovingontootherborrowersatlaterstages.Bankswithmoremodestparticipationconcentratedtheirlendingaroundbranchesfortheentiretyoftheprogram,suggestingthesebanksdidnotexpandbeyondexistingclients.Ultimately,theresultssuggestthatthereisabenefittohavingarelationshipwithanactivePPPlender. IrationalizethesethreefindingsinamodelwherebanksareheterogeneousintheirPPPlendingtechnology,borrowersfacetimecoststoswitchingbanks,andthespatialdistributionoflendingdiffersforrelationship