坦克里的美中关系：持续对抗时代的手册（英）

CSISBRIEFS ByMichaelJ.Mazarr THEISSUE: EDITORS’NOTE NOVEMBER2022 policymakersnavigatinganincreasinglycrisis-proneU.S.-Chinarelationship. EditedbyJudeBlanchetteofCSISandHalBrandsofSAIS,theMarshallPapersisaseriesofessaysthatprobesandchallengestheassessmentsunderpinningtheU.S.approachtogreatpowerrivalry.ThePaperswillberigorousyetprovocative,continuallypushingtheboundariesofintellectualandpolicydebates.InthisMarshallPaper,MichaelJ.MazarrarguesthatamidescalatingU.S.-Chinatensions,Americanpolicymakersaregravelyunderpreparedtomanagetheepisodiccrisesthatformaninevitablepartofgreatpowerrivalry.Effectivecrisisresponsecannotonlypreventescalation,butalsostrengthenU.S.strategicadvantagewithinthelargerrivalry.DrawinglessonsfromtheColdWar,MazarrdistillssixprinciplestoguidecrisismanagementamongU.S. W ithU.S.-Chinarelationsalreadyheadedtowardamorebelligerentrivalry,U.S.HouseofRepresentativesSpeakerNancyPelosi’svisittoTaiwaninAugust2022wasbound tocauseheartburninBeijing.Chinarespondedwithanelaborateshowofforcearoundtheisland:shootingmissilesoverTaiwanandintoJapaneseexclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ)waters,firingrocketartilleryintotheTaiwanStrait,declaringaringofmaritimeexclusionzonesaroundTaiwan,andsurgingover200militaryaircraftand50shipsintoTaiwaneseairspaceandwaters.1ManynowrefertotheeventastheFourthTaiwanStraitCrisis.2 YetcomparedtopreviousconfrontationsaroundTaiwan,theUnitedStatesthistimefailedtoplaymuchofitsappointedpart.TheBidenadministrationmostlystayedaloof,condemningChina’sactionsbutnotdispatching U.S.forcestoconfrontChinadirectly.3Iftherewasacrisis,itwaslargelyone-sided,withChinaposturingand slingingmissilesandtheUnitedStateswatchingfromthesidelines.TheresultingU.S.coolnessleftChinathrashinginaperformativedisplaythatproducedcondemnationsfromJapan,Australia,andEurope.4 ThisU.S.strategymighthavebeenquietlybrilliant,invitingChinatostampandroaranddrivemanycountriesfurtherintoabalancingcoalition.TheadministrationmayhavedecidedthatabelligerentresponsewouldhavebeeninappropriategiventhatithadbeentheactionofaU.S.officialthathadsparkedthecrisis.Butitremainstobeseenifrestraintwastherightchoice.ThecrisisarguablyfurnishedChinawithanabilitytosetanewthresholdformilitaryintimidationinthestraitandbeyond.5Someobserversworriedthat U.S.moderationwouldencourageChinatoescalateitscoercioninthefuture,aconcernfueledinpartbycommentaryinChinathatseemedtobragabouttheabsenceofamoreforcefulU.S.response.6 Onethingseemsclear:aneraofpersistentconfrontationsinU.S.-Chinarelationshasarrived.7Theescalatingrivalry U.S.-ChinaRelationsintheTank AHandbookforanEraofPersistentConfrontation is,unavoidably,along-termcampaignforpredominanceinwhicheachsidemakesinvestments,buildsforces,anddevelopstechnologiestogaincompetitiveadvantage—assymbolizedbythesetofpotentsanctionsWashington recentlyimposedonTaiwan’ssemiconductorindustry.8Butitwillalsotakeamoreperilousformasaseriesofdiscretecollisionsthatdemandcarefulstatecraft.NotalltheseeventswillbeonthescaleoftheTaiwanStraitCrisis.Somecould involvesuddendisclosuresofChinesetroopsatforeignbases,large-scalecyberintrusionsofU.S.systems,orproxyconflictsthatemergeoutofdisputesoverthirdparties.9Butsome oftheconfrontationscouldbeevenviolentanddangerous,suchasoutrightChinesemilitaryactionagainstislandsintheTaiwanStrait,anall-outblockadeofTaiwanitself,orevenseemingpreparationsforaninvasion.10 IndealingwiththeTaiwanissueandlargerU.S.-Chinarelations,theUnitedStatesshouldkeepfirmlyinmindthattheseareprimarilypoliticalissues,whichdemanddiplomaticsolutions.Attendingtothestatecraftofthelargerrelationshipistheessentialroutetoavoidingandmitigatingcrises.Butinintenserivalries,crisesarelikelytoemergedespitesuchefforts.Insuchaneraofpersistentclashes,theUnitedStateswillneedcriteriatoguideitsresponses—ahandbookformanagingaseriesofskirmisheswithinthelargerrivalry.11ThisessayoffersaninitialdownpaymentonsuchthinkingbydrawinglessonsfromthemostrecentU.S.experiencewithmanagingcriseswithinalargerrivalry:theColdWar.ItusesthoselessonstosuggestsixprinciplesformanagingconfrontationswithChina.Theresultingapproachistogetthefundamentalsofasystemiccompetitionrightandthenstrikeadifficultbutnecessarybalance:respondrapidlyanddecisivelyinsupportofafewvitalcommitmentswhileresistingtheurgetoendowlesserclasheswithunduesignificance. Insuchaneraofpersistentclashes,theUnitedStateswillneedcriteriatoguideitsresponses—ahandbookformanagingaseriesofskirmisheswithinthelargerrivalry. DIAGNOSINGARIVALRY:LESSONSANDINSIGHTSFROMTHECOLDWAR Insomecriticalways,theemergingrivalryisunliketheColdWar.Chinaismoreofanaggrievedrisingpowerdeterminedtorecaptureitsplaceinworldpoliticsthanthe SovietUnionwasatthebeginningoftheColdWar.China’seconomicandtechnologicalpowerisvastlygreater,anditmayturnouttobemorepugnaciousincrises—moreself-righteous,moreoverconfident(partlyoutofafaithinitsabilitytocontrolcrisesandlimitedwarsinamechanisticway),moreanxioustousecrisestoteachpunitivelessons,andlesswillingtonegotiateorevencommunicateduringaskirmishifitbelievesdoingsowouldsignalweakness.12Butthereareenoug