CIDOB notes internacionals 255 highlights the COVID-driven crisis and its impact on the completion of the euro's construction and pursuit of convergence among European nations. The document emphasizes the significance of this period as a "Hamiltonian moment," referencing the historical precedent of replacing individual state debts with national federal debt. It explores the Next Generation EU (NGEU), the cornerstone of the new EU policy response, questioning its claim as a significant step towards a federal union.
The paper delves into the challenges faced in achieving convergence through the euro, describing it as an unfinished and asymmetric union. It discusses the economic and fiscal policies that coexist within the eurozone, emphasizing the role of member states in implementing economic policies while the EU acts as a facilitator through rules, regulations, and surveillance. The document acknowledges the need for mechanisms to address divergences and external shocks that could jeopardize convergence, while acknowledging the lack of fiscal capacity in the EU and the limited mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB).
The paper traces the history of the euro, noting that Spain was one of its early adopters, benefiting from the reduced interest rate differentials and increased investment. However, it also points out that Spain fell short in completing key economic reforms necessary for convergence, particularly in dealing with low productivity, a fragile export base, high unemployment, and weak public finance management. Italy, Greece, and other countries followed suit, joining the euro despite reservations and criticisms from the European Commission.
The document then moves onto the 2008 debt crisis, triggered by the subprime loan crisis in the US and the subsequent bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This crisis led to a global financial crisis, with peripheral EU countries facing increased funding costs and being pushed out of the market. The debt crisis turned into a sovereign crisis, with the EU struggling to find adequate responses. The paper discusses the ad hoc bailouts provided to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus, highlighting the severity of the situation in Greece and the consequences for other large economies.
The paper argues that the euro crisis revealed that the convergence objective had not been achieved, and the solutions found were unsatisfactory for all parties involved. It discusses how the Greek debt crisis affected other countries, leading to the necessity of rescue packages for various nations. The document then focuses on Spain, detailing how the financial crisis led to a banking crisis that had the potential to escalate into a sovereign debt crisis. The ad hoc response to the euro crisis is criticized for not addressing the underlying issues of economic convergence and fiscal responsibility.
In conclusion, the paper identifies the COVID-driven crisis as a unique opportunity for a new policy approach, specifically through the Next Generation EU program. It questions the transformative potential of this instrument and raises concerns about the potential risks, such as the possibility of failure rendering EU solidarity politically unappealing and threatening the eurozone's integrity. The paper suggests that the Spanish plan serves as a test case for the success of the initiative and emphasizes the importance of regular financial execution over efficiency and effectiveness, with benchmarks left unspecified. It concludes by expressing doubt about the EU's ability to monitor implementation effectively, given limited resources.