规章制度、管理时间与经济发展（英）

PublicDisclosureAuthorized PublicDisclosureAuthorized PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10761 RulesandRegulations,ManagerialTimeandEconomicDevelopment M.NazımTamkoçGustavoVentura DevelopmentEconomicsGlobalIndicatorsGroupMay2024 PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10761 Abstract Thispaperdocumentsthatseniorplantmanagersinless-developedcountriesspendmoretimedealingwithgov-ernmentrulesandregulationsthantheircounterpartsinrichercountries.Thesefactsareinterpretedthroughthelensofaspan-of-controlgrowthmodel,inwhichtopmanagersrunheterogeneousproductionplants,employingmiddlemanagersaswellasproductionworkers.Themodelimpliesthatincreasingthetimeburdenontopmanagementleadstoequilibriumchangesinwages,occupationalsorting,thesizedistributionofproductionplantsandultimately,toareductioninaggregateoutput.Theseconsequenceshold evenwhenthetimeburdenissymmetricacrossallplants.Quantitativeresultsshowthatincreasingtheburdenonmanagers’timefromthelevelsobservedinDenmarktothehigherlevelsobservedinpoorercountrieshavesubstantialconsequences.Imposingtheaveragetimespentonregula-tionsinArgentinareducesaggregateoutputbyabout1/3andmeanplantsizebymorethan5employees.Resultscontributetorationalizingdifferencesinplantsizeandoutputacrosscountriesviaachannelhithertounexploredintheliterature. ThispaperisaproductoftheGlobalIndicatorsGroup,DevelopmentEconomics.ItispartofalargereffortbytheWorldBanktoprovideopenaccesstoitsresearchandmakeacontributiontodevelopmentpolicydiscussionsaroundtheworld.PolicyResearchWorkingPapersarealsopostedontheWebathttp://www.worldbank.org/prwp.Theauthorsmaybecontactedatmtamkoc@worldbank.org. ThePolicyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesdisseminatesthefindingsofworkinprogresstoencouragetheexchangeofideasaboutdevelopmentissues.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthanfullypolished.Thepaperscarrythenamesoftheauthorsandshouldbecitedaccordingly.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent. ProducedbytheResearchSupportTeam RulesandRegulations,ManagerialTime andEconomicDevelopment M.NazımTamkoc¸andGustavoVentura?* JELClassiications:E23,E24,J24,M11,O43,O47. KeyWords:Managers;TimeTax;EconomicDevelopment;PlantSize;Distortions. *Tamko¸cTheWorldBank;Ventura,DepartmentofEconomics,ArizonaStateUniversity,USA.We thankJorgeLuisRodriguezMeza,andseminarandworkshopparticipantsatCEMFI,UniversityofPennsylvania,MidwestMacroConference,SED2023,SAET-Parisandthe2023meetingsoftheAso-ciaci´onArgentinadeEconom´ıaPol´ıticaforcomments.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent. ?Correspondingauthor:GustavoVentura.Email:gustavo.ventura@asu.edu 1Introduction Ithaslongbeenarguedthatthebusinessenvironmentinless-developedcountriesinvolvesmorerules,regulationsandredtapethaninricherones,hinderingthedevelopmentofprivatebusinessesasindevelopedeconomiesandultimatelycontributingtolowerlivingstandards.Oneaspectofexcessiveorinefficientrulesandregulationsthatcanbepartic-ularlydetrimentaliswhentheydiverttimefromproductiveactivities.Simpleexamplesabound.InDenmark,forinstance,ittakesonaverageonehundredandthirtytwohourstopaytaxesperyear,fourdaystoregisterbusinessproperty,andsixtyfourdaystodealwithabuildingpermit.InMexico,thecorrespondingfiguresarestrikinglyhigher:twohundredandeightyeighthours,sixtyfivedaysandninetyninedays,respectively.1Similarexamplescanbedocumentedforeconomiesatsimilarlevelsofdevelopment. Inthispaper,wefocuswithhighresolutiononthediversionoftimefromproductiveactivitiesofmanagerscausedbyrulesandregulations.Foreaseofexposition,werefertothisphenomenonasthetimeburdenonmanagers,orsimplyasthetimetax.Wefirstextensivelydocumenttheincidenceofthisimplicittaxacrosscountries.Wetheninterpretthedataviathelensofagrowthmodel,inwhichthespanofcontrolofmanagersisdistortedbyatimetax,andquantifyitsconsequences. OurempiricalanalysisleveragesdatafromtheWorldBankEnterpriseSurvey,whereacommonsetofquestionsareaskedtorepresentativesamplesofestablishmentsindif-ferentcountries.Inthisdata,wefocusonthetimetaxonseniorortopmanagement,definedasthefractionoftheirtimedevotedtodealwithrulesandregulations.Inthisdata,theaveragetimetaxofrichcountrieslikeDenmark,theNetherlandsandSwedenaveragesabout6-7%,whileforTu¨rkiye,MexicoandArgentinacanbethreetimesaslarge,ataround15-20%.Usingthisdata,wedocumentthatseniormanagementinrichercountriessystematicallydevotelesstimetodealwithgovernmentrulesandregulationsthantheircounterpartsinlessdevelopedcountries.Wefindthatthisrelationshipholdsaftercontrollingforahostofplantcharacteristics,holdsinmanufacturingandservices,andholdsaftercontrollingfortwo-digitindustrycharacteristics.Ourestimatesimplyt