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非弹性需求满足风险主权债券的最优供应（英）

金融2024-03-01世界银行丁***

AI智能总结

Policy Research Working Paper 10735 titled "Inelastic Demand Meets Optimal Supply of Risky Sovereign Bonds" explores the behavior of investors in international capital markets, particularly focusing on emerging economies' reliance on bonds issued in these markets. The study contrasts standard sovereign debt models that often assume investor demand for bonds is perfectly elastic, with recent research suggesting a more complex investor demand structure, characterized by inelastic or downward-sloping demand curves.

Key Findings

Empirical Evidence of Inelastic Demand: The paper presents evidence of downward-sloping demand curves in the market for risky sovereign bonds. This means that investors are not willing to lend unlimited amounts of money at the risk-free rate plus a default risk premium, indicating a degree of inelasticity in demand.
Methodological Approach: To address the challenges in estimating demand elasticity, the authors combine a novel identification strategy with a structural model. This approach allows them to isolate the endogenous responses of governments to changes in bond supply.
Identification of Shocks: The researchers exploit monthly changes in the composition of the largest index for emerging economies' bonds—the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global Diversified (EMBIGD). By focusing on the issuance or retirement of bonds from other countries in the index, they identify exogenous shocks to the available bond supply, which helps in estimating price reactions.
Estimation of Price Reactions: Using the identified shocks, the paper finds that a 1 percentage point reduction in the available bond supply increases bond prices by 33 basis points. This suggests a significant impact of supply changes on bond pricing, even when these changes are not related to country fundamentals.
Structural Elasticity Identification: To further understand the dynamics, the authors identify a structural demand elasticity through indirect inference. They formulate a quantitative sovereign debt model that characterizes governments' optimal debt and default policies, allowing them to isolate endogenous responses to shocks and identify the structural elasticity. It's found that over one-third of the reduced-form elasticity is explained by endogenous government responses that decrease default risk.
Implications for Governments: The study highlights that inelastic demand acts as a commitment device, limiting governments' debt issuances and reducing default risk. This insight is crucial for policymakers in managing sovereign debt and mitigating financial risks associated with borrowing in international markets.

Conclusion

This paper contributes to the understanding of how investors' demand for risky sovereign bonds behaves and interacts with government policies. By identifying the inelastic nature of demand and its implications for optimal debt management, the research offers valuable insights for policymakers, economists, and investors dealing with emerging market debt.

PublicDisclosureAuthorized PublicDisclosureAuthorized PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10735 InelasticDemandMeetsOptimalSupplyofRiskySovereignBonds MatíasMorettiLorenzoPandolfiSergioL.SchmuklerGermánVillegasBauerTomásWilliams DevelopmentEconomicsDevelopmentResearchGroupMarch2024 PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10735 Abstract Thispaperpresentsevidenceofinelasticdemandinthemarketforriskysovereignbondsandexaminesitsinter-playwithgovernmentpolicies.Themethodologycombinesbond-levelevidencewithastructuralmodelfeaturingendogenousbondissuancesanddefaultrisk.Empirically,thepaperexploitsmonthlychangesinthecompositionofamajorbondindextoidentifyflowshocksthatshifttheavailablebondsupplyandareunrelatedtocountryfundamentals.Thepaperfindsthata1percentagepoint reductionintheavailablesupplyincreasesbondpricesby33basispoints.Althoughexogenous,theseshocksmightinflu-encegovernmentpoliciesandexpectedbondpayoffs.Thepaperidentifiesastructuraldemandelasticitybyfeedingtheestimatedpricereactionsintoasovereigndebtmodelthatisolatesendogenousgovernmentresponses.Theseresponsesaccountforathirdoftheestimatedpricereactions.Bypenalizingadditionalborrowing,inelasticdemandactsasacommitmentdevicethatreducesdefaultrisk. ThispaperisaproductoftheDevelopmentResearchGroup,DevelopmentEconomics.ItispartofalargereffortbytheWorldBanktoprovideopenaccesstoitsresearchandmakeacontributiontodevelopmentpolicydiscussionsaroundtheworld.PolicyResearchWorkingPapersarealsopostedontheWebathttp://www.worldbank.org/prwp.Theauthorsmaybecontactedatmatias.moretti@rochester.edu;lorenzo.pandolfi@unina.it;sschmukler@worldbank.org;gvillegasbauer@imf.org;tomaswilliams@email.gwu.edu. ThePolicyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesdisseminatesthefindingsofworkinprogresstoencouragetheexchangeofideasaboutdevelopmentissues.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthanfullypolished.Thepaperscarrythenamesoftheauthorsandshouldbecitedaccordingly.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent. ProducedbytheResearchSupportTeam InelasticDemandMeetsOptimalSupplyofRiskySovereignBonds∗ Mat´ıasMoretti UniversityofRochester LorenzoPandolfi UniversityofNaplesFedericoIIandCSEF SergioL.Schmukler WorldBank Germ´anVillegasBauer InternationalMonetaryFund Tom´asWilliams GeorgeWashingtonUniversity Keywords:emergingmarketsbondindex,inelasticfinancialmarkets,institutionalinvestors,internationalcapitalmarkets,smallopeneconomies,sovereigndebt JELCodes:F34,F41,G11,G15 ∗WethankWalkerRayandtheparticipantsatapresentationheldattheASSAAnnualMeetingsforhelpfulfeedback.WearegratefultoPatricioYunisforresearchassistanceandAntonnParkforcopyediting.TheWorldBankChileResearchandDevelopmentCenterandKnowledgeforChangeProgram(KCP)andGeorgeWashingtonUniversityFacilitatingFund(GWUUFF)providedfinancialsupportforthispaper.LorenzoPandolfigratefullyacknowledgesfinancialsupportfromtheUnicreditFoundation.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMFortheWorldBank,thoseoftheirExecutiveDirectors,orthegovernmentstheyrepresent.Moretti:matias.moretti@rochester.edu.Pandolfi:lorenzo.pandolfi@unina.it.Schmukler:sschmukler@worldbank.org.VillegasBauer:gvillegasbauer@imf.org.Williams:tomaswilliams@email.gwu.edu. 1Introduction Governmentsinemergingeconomiesheavilydependonbondsissuedinliquidinternationalcapitalmarketsfortheiroverallfinancing.Thebehaviorofinvestorsinthesemarketsisthuscrucialtounderstandinggovernments’borrowingcosts,defaultrisk,andoptimaldebtmanagement.Standardsovereigndebtmodelsoftenassumethatinvestordemandisperfectlyelastic,implyingthatinvestorsarewillingtolendanyamountgovernmentsrequestattherisk-freerateplusadefaultriskpremium.Thisassumptiononinvestorbehaviorcontrastswithabodyofrecentworkforotherassetmarketsthatallowsforaricherinvestordemandstructure,typicallyinvolvinganinelasticordownward-slopingdemand(KoijenandYogo,2019;GabaixandKoijen,2021;VayanosandVila,2021;Gourinchasetal.,2022;Greenwoodetal.,2023). Inthispaper,wepresentnovelevidenceofdownward-slopingdemandcurvesinriskysovereignbondmarketsandanalyzetheirimpactongovernments’optimaldebtpolicies.Inthecontextofriskysovereignbonds,estimatingademandelasticityischallengingfortwomainreasons.Ideally,onewouldliketoidentifyshockstotheavailablebondsupplythatareunrelatedtocountryfundamentals,estimatepricereactionsaroundthem,andmapthoseeffectsintoanelasticity.However,suchexogenousshocksarerareforsovereignbonds.Moreover,evenifonewereabletoidentifythoseshocks,governmentscouldrespondtothembyadjustingfutureissuancesortheirdefaultlikelihood.Thus,theestimatedpricereactionmightnotjustcaptureadownward-slopingdemandcurvebutalsochangesinbonds’expectedpayoffs. Weovercomethesechallengesbycombininganovelidentificationstrategywithastructuralmod

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