WORKINGPAPER|ISSUE20/2022|20DECEMBER2022 THEIMPACTOFTHEUKRAINECRISISONINTERNATIONALTRADE ZSOLTDARVASANDCATARINAMARTINS WestudytheeconomicimplicationsofRussia’sinvasionofUkraine,byscrutinisingglobaltradevolumesandcommodityprices,tradebalancesandbilateraltradeflowsbetweenmajoreconomicpowersandRussia.Wefindthatenergypricesincreasedmorein2021thanin2022,suggestingthatthewarandthesanctionswerenotthemostimportantdrivers.Nevertheless, InternationalMonetaryFundforecastrevisionsfromOctober2021toOctober2022suggestthatthevolumeofglobaltradeingoodsandservicesdeclinedby3.4percent,energypricesincreasedbyabout100percent,andthepricesofnon-energycommoditiesby8percent.Thewarcould beanimportantdriveroftheseforecastrevisions,thoughotherfactorswerealsoatplay.Whileforecastsforimportantindustrialproductioninputcostswerenotrevised,soaringenergypricesdeterioratedthetradebalanceofcountriesimportingenergy. OnlyhalfoftheincreaseinRussia’stradesurpluswasrelatedtosoaringenergyprices.TheotherhalfresultedfromthecollapseofRussianimports,whichwilllikelyunderminetheRussianeconomy’sproductivecapacityovertime.FallingRussianexportsofgoodsotherthanmineralfuelssuggestRussia’sproductivecapacityhasalreadyweakened.Russia’stradehasbeenreorientedfromadvancedeconomiestoChina,IndiaandTurkey,butthishasonlypartiallycompensatedforthedeclineintradewithadvancedcountries. Wefindthatsanctionshadanimpactontrade.ThereisnoevidenceofEuropeanandUScompaniescircumventingsanctionsbyre-routingsanctionedgoodstoRussiaviaChinaandTurkey.TheUKandtheUShavealreadystoppedimportingfossilfuelsfromRussia,andsuchimportsbytheEUhavedeclined.WiththeEU’sRussianseabornecrudepetroleumimportbantakingeffectinDecember2022andtherefinedpetroleumbancomingtoeffectinFebruary2023,Russia’srevenuesfromfossilfuelexportstotheEUaresettoshrinksignificantly,withlimitedoptionsforredirectingexportstoothercountries. Thethreemainpolicy-relevantimplicationsfromourresearchare: •Thewarandthesanctionsarenotthemostimportantdriversofenergyprices; •Thedirectaimofsanctionsseemstohavebeenachieved; •ThecapacityoftheRussianstatetofinancethewarfromfossilfuelrevenuesisboundtoshrink. PaperpreparedfortheNomuraFoundation’sMacroEconomyResearchConference2022on‘TheImpactoftheUkraineCrisisontheGlobalEconomy’,Tokyo,27October2022.TheauthorsthankMariaDemertzis,MasahiroKawai,AtsushiNakajimaandparticipantsintheNomuraFoundationConferenceandthe31October2022BruegelResearchMeetingforusefulcommentsandsuggestions,andConorMcCaffreyforhishelpwithupdatingthedataset. ZsoltDarvas(zsolt.darvas@bruegel.org)isaSeniorFellowatBruegelandSeniorResearchFellowatCorvinusUniversityofBudapest CatarinaMartins(catarina.martins@bruegel.org)isaResearchAnalystatBruegel Recommendedcitation: Darvas,Z.andC.Martins(2022)‘TheimpactoftheUkrainecrisisoninternationaltrade’, WorkingPaper20/2022,Bruegel 1Introduction On24February2022,RussiainvadedUkraine,triggeringinternationalcondemnation.The2March2022UnitedNationsresolutiondemandingthatRussiaimmediatelyenditsmilitaryoperationsinUkrainewasadoptedby141countries,with37abstentionsand5against,whilethe12October2022UNresolutiondemandingthereversalofRussia’sattemptedillegalannexationofUkrainianterritorieswasadoptedby143countries,with35abstentionsand5against1. Theinternationalcondemnationwasfollowedquicklybytheimpositionofwide-rangingeconomicsanctionsonRussia,andtheprovisionofmilitarysupporttoUkraine,bymostOECDandEuropeanUnioncountries.Trade-relatedsanctionshaveincludedprohibitionsofexportstoRussiaofstrategicgoods,includinghigh-techgoodsandcomponentsforuseinelectronics,telecommunications,aerospaceandoilrefining,amongothersectors.SanctionsimposedbytheUnitedStatesapplynotonlytogoodsexportedbyUScompanies,butalsotogoodsproducedelsewhereusingUStechnologies.Theextra-territorialnatureofUSsanctionshaslikelyimpactedexportstoRussiaevenfromcountriesthathavenotappliedsanctions.TheEU,UnitedKingdomandUShavealsoannouncedplanstophaseoutimportsofRussianenergy. Thewarhittheglobaleconomybycreatingnewgeopoliticalandeconomicuncertainties,soaringenergyprices,anddisruptionstoglobalvaluechainsinwhichRussianandUkrainiancompanieswereinvolved.EconomicsanctionsexertedadverseeffectsnotonlyonRussia,butalsooncountriesthatimposedthemand,moregenerally,onothereconomiesbecauseofhigherenergyandcommodityprices. IsolatingtheimpactontheglobaleconomyandtradeofRussia’swarisdifficultbecauseglobalinflationpressureswerebuildingupalreadybeforethewar,alongwiththerecoveryfromtheCOVID-19pandemic.Thepandemicresultedinshortagesofvariousmaterialsandmachinery,andinincreasedtransportationcostsandtimes.Thefiscalstimulusimplementedbymostcountriesaroundtheworldin2020-2021supportedhouseholdincomes,buttheuncertaintyandlockdownrestrictionsboostedhouseholdsavingsinseveralcountries,creatingpent-updemand.Sandbu(2022)arguedthatoneofthereasonsfortheglobalsurgeininflation,whichcameearlierthantheenergypriceshock,wasthestrongreboundinUSconsumergoodsdemand,leadingtoaglobalscarcityofgoods,withspill-overeffectsontherestoftheworld.Aspandemic-relatedrestrictionswereeasedandlargelyeliminate