2026年日本经济：值得关注的10个要点

JapanJapan EconomicsJapan Economic Perspectives Japan's economy in 2026: 10 points towatch Kentaro Koyama, Ph.D.Chief Economist+81-3-6730-0683 We are focusing on the following 10 themes for the Japanese economy in 2026. Fordetails on our growth and inflation forecasts for 2026, please refer to our separatelypublishedreport. 1.New growth strategy and the Basic Policies2.The possibility of a snap general election3.A 1% policy rate and the achievement of the price stability target4.The BoJ's review of its JGB purchases5.BoJ board member appointments6.The deterioration of the BoJ's financial health7.The restart of nuclear power plants8.The $550 billion investment in the U.S.9.Japan-China relations10. India surpassing Japan in nominal GDP 1. New growth strategy and the Basic Policies In November 2025, Prime Minister Takaichi established the Japan Growth StrategyCouncil, launching the full-scale development of a new growth strategy. Takaichi isadvocating for a strong economy through "crisis management investment" and"growth investment," and has designated 17 strategic fields, including artificialintelligence, semiconductors, and shipbuilding, aiming for focused investmentthrough public-private partnerships. She has also ordered the creation of a "Public-Private Investment Roadmap" that will detail the investment content, timing, andtarget amounts for each of these fields. The new growth strategy is scheduled to be compiled in June 2026, and its contentswill be crucial in indicating the future direction of fiscal policy. In particular, webelieve the size of the budget request for fiscal year 2027, due in August, will heavilydepend on the content of this strategy. At a minimum, it will likely exceed the 122trillion yen requested for fiscal year 2026. Following this growth strategy, the "BasicPolicies on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform" are also expected to beannounced around June. In addition to future fiscal policy, coordination withmonetary policy will be a key point of focus. Furthermore, in relation to the BoJ'sachievement of its price stability target, which will be discussed later, whether thegovernment declares an end to deflation will also be important. 2. The possibility of a snap general election The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) does not hold a sole majority in either the Houseof Representatives (Lower House) or the House of Councillors (Upper House). Itscoalition with the Japan Innovation Party (strictly speaking, cooperation fromoutside the cabinet) has just begun, and its stability is uncertain. In such a situation,Takaichi would have an incentive to call a snap general election to secure, at the veryleast, a sole majority in the Lower House. Takaichi's current high approval ratingscould further strengthen this incentive (Figure 1). The earliest opportunity for a dissolution of the Diet would be in March-April, afterthe budget passes. However, dissolving the Diet while the formulation of theaforementioned growth strategy is in its final stages would likely prove difficult. Amore probable scenario is a dissolution in June, after the new growth strategy isunveiled, in order to seek a public mandate. Following the same logic, it is alsoconceivable that the Prime Minister could present the initial budget request forfiscalyear 2027 in August and then dissolve the Diet during the autumnextraordinary session to seek public approval. Even if a dissolution does not occurat that time, it is highly likely that a snap general election will be held by September2027 at the latest, which coincides with the end of Prime Minister Takaichi's termas LDP president. 3. A 1% policy rate and the achievement of the price stability target We expect two additional 25bp rate hikes in April and October 2026, bringing thepolicy rate to 1.25% (Figure 2). The current rate of 0.75% is already a 30-year high,but reaching the psychological milestone of 1% could trigger various (andunexpected) reactions. In particular, the expectation among Japanese householdsthat low interest rates will persist (a low-interest-rate mindset) is deeply rooted. Theproportion of mortgages with variable interest rates has continued to rise even afterthe negative interest rate policy was lifted in March 2024 (Figure 3). This suggeststhat households expect short-term interest rates to remain low. This increases therisk that short-term rates will rise more than households anticipate, which couldhave unforeseen negative impacts. Additionally, while households' transferabledeposits are increasing, their term deposits are decreasing (Figure 4). As there iscurrently no significant difference between interest rates on ordinary and termdeposits, preferring transferable deposits for liquidity reasons is somewhatrational. This rationality is further enhanced if one assumes low interest rates willcontinue. However, if interest rates rise more than households expect, a rapid shiftfrom transferable deposits to term deposits could occur. Further